Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

95. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 15, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Executive Committee Meeting on Southeast Asia, 15 June 1964

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary William Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary Cleveland, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Sullivan
• Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Vance, General Taylor, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Cater
• Mr. Bell, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Stoneman, Mr. Don Wilson
• Mr. McCone, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Colby

Summary

Concern was expressed about South Vietnamese morale and the need for assurances of U.S. determination. There was some obscurity as to the Country Team position on the eight province program which will be clarified by further cables.

It was concluded that a Congressional Resolution is not now feasible but that an effort is needed to develop a better base of understanding in the Congress, and support of the Administration’s policy, through speeches. Part of this must come from an increase of third country participation in the struggle in South Vietnam. It was agreed that a contingency plan is needed for specific military reactions to possible Pathet Lao or Viet Minh advances in Laos. Additional escorted U.S. photo missions over Laos will be authorized but will be run in a safer manner.

1. The meeting opened with a discussion of Mr. Sullivan’s 15 June paper on Vietnam.² This led to a rather inconclusive discussion of South Vietnamese morale and the degree to which it was dependent upon a conviction of U.S. determination to support Vietnam.

[Here follow continued discussion of Vietnam, a possible Congressional resolution, and Rusk’s discussions with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam.]

4. The meeting reviewed Mr. McGeorge Bundy’s attached paper on a policy without a Congressional Resolution.³ Mr. William Bundy expressed the need for a scenario for appropriate reactions to small scale Pathet Lao or Viet Minh advances, such as additional T–28s at Udorn but with non-U.S. military pilots. It was agreed that planners should meet for this purpose [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Bundy also felt that a contingency plan should be drawn up for the possible loss of Saravane or Attopeu, which he thought should be replied to by Vietnamese Air Force strikes in the corridor. Secretary McNamara recommended that a specific plan be drawn up along this line and that at least initial conversation on it be held with Souvanna Phouma. Mr. McGeorge Bundy asked what the objective of such action would be, whether to punish the Pathet Lao or to roll them back. Mr. McNamara replied that the purpose would be to slow the Pathet Lao advance and to assist South Vietnamese morale. Mr. McNamara emphasized his concern over the absence of a contingency plan for our reactions and that he felt the President should have a much better view of what we are thinking of over the next two weeks. General Taylor suggested that we try to define what is meant by a “push to the Mekong”. With respect to the Polish Conference Mr. McNamara commented that we will try to drag it out, Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the present indication is that one will not take place and Mr. William Bundy expounded on the effort he is making to bring it about. Secretary Rusk terminated this discussion by requesting that a plan for reaction to specific military contingencies be staffed out.

5. Mr. McNamara then raised the desirability of an additional photo mission over the Plaine des Jarres. General Taylor said that JCS recommended a medium level (10,000 feet above terrain) flight wherever weather permitted, for greater safety against anti-aircraft. In the Plaine des Jarres and in other difficult areas he recommended that there be no low level operations unless there is a strong military or political reason. Mr. McNamara stated there is a political motivation for a mission during this week but that this need not be in a hot area; therefore he recommended a mission over Nape, escorted [sic]. Secretary Rusk believed that U.S. jets over Laos provide a good political signal and he approved the Nape idea. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that we will at sometime have to return to the Plaine des Jarres or we will not show the proper signal of strength but that is not an immediate necessity.⁴

WE Colby

Chief, Far East Division

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 16. The meeting lasted from 6 to approximately 7:20 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
2. According to a June 15 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to McNamara, the purpose of this meeting was to consider five papers. The principal question for discussion was whether the group should recommend to the President that he seek a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia. A second question, according to Bundy, was what action should be suggested if a resolution was not recommended. Bundy’s memorandum to McNamara, its four papers, and one supplemental paper, are in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 500–518.
3. Dated June 15, the paper was one of the five prepared for this meeting. (Ibid., pp. 516–518) It examined potential policy decisions if the United States did not decide upon a Congressional resolution and major military action against North Vietnam. Included as possible military actions in Laos were reconnaissance, reconnaissance-strikes, T–28 operations, and South Vietnamese Air Force strikes in the Laos corridor. Political actions relating to Laos included support for a diplomatic track, an effort to sustain the Souvanna government by restraining the right-wing Lao forces, and support for Kong Le.
4. William Bundy also prepared a paper dated June 12—the second of the five papers—on the case for the Congressional resolution entitled “Memorandum on Southeast Asia,” which dealt primarily with Laos. Bundy noted that “now that we have worked through the immediate problem of shooting down of our aircraft over Laos and have Souvanna Phouma’s clear understanding that reconnaissance flights may continue over the Plaine des Jarres and ‘South Laos’ and with escort as necessary, we should now draw back and examine the total picture as it may develop in the next three to four months and what our plan should be.” For text, see ibid., pp. 507–512.