96. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate of Intelligence (Cooper) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone1
SUBJECT
- A Course of Action for Laos
US Objectives in Laos
1. Recent events in Southeast Asia and current discussions in Washington warrant a restatement of our objectives in Laos. Unless we have consciously or sub-consciously modified our objectives, it is my understanding that we continue to want: a Laos in which a genuinely neutral and viable government effectively rules the country; a situation in which neither the government nor the territory of Laos is used to threaten the integrity or the internal stability of our two allies, Thailand and South Vietnam. (It may be, of course, that the objective circumstances in Southeast Asia, generally, and Laos, particularly, may make these ambitious objectives impossible of achievement.)
2. Having stated our objectives, we should distinguish between them and the means by which we choose to achieve them. We signed the Geneva Accords in 1962 because we believed they provided a means, admittedly imperfect, for the achievement of our objectives. They were not an end in themselves. If the Geneva Accords are grossly and constantly violated by the Communists, presumably we have to achieve our ends through other means. The following scenario has been developed with this in mind. Whether this scenario “fuses” or “de-fuses” the situation in Laos depends as much on the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh as it does on us. (But this is true for almost anything we do short of large scale US military attacks on North Vietnam on the one hand, or abandoning Laos on the other.)
The Scenario
3. Whether it is explicitly stated or not, most, if not all of the courses of action recently developed with respect to Laos wind up in Geneva by one route or another. Since our own case with respect to observing the Geneva Accords is better now than it is likely to be as time goes on, our position might be best served by taking strong, even self-righteous, initiatives for an early Geneva conference. Rather than being dragged to [Page 189] one kicking and screaming as if we were the defendant, we should notify the two co-chairmen that we insist that a conference be held as soon as possible.
4. Our preconditions should not be a pull-back of the Pathet Lao from the Plaine des Jarres (we won’t get it anyway), but rather: that the conference be confined to Laos; that it be directed exclusively to a restoration of the Geneva Accords; and that it last only two to three weeks. We should further insist, not only that the forms of the Geneva agreement be restored, but that they be adequately and effectively policed by a reconstituted ICC.
5. As implied above, our posture at such a conference should be tough and aggressive, taking advantage of our good case and of the split in the ranks of the Communist Bloc.
6. Unless our terms were met in the time period prescribed, we should indicate that we plan to achieve the objectives sought in the Geneva Accords by unilateral moves. While we need not be specific as to what we mean by this, we should provide ample evidence of our intent to move militarily.
7. If in fact the Geneva Accords are not reconstituted at this conference, we should move into that part of Laos most important to us (along the South Vietnamese and Thai borders and into the key Mekong River towns). We should then emphasize our readiness to reconvene at Geneva and, upon a satisfactory agreement there, our willingness to remove our forces. We should point to Lebanon as an example of our sincerity.
Accompanying Moves
8. Obviously, we should undertake, on a crash basis, the necessary arrangements for moving into Laos, hopefully within hours after the breakup of a Geneva Conference.
9. We should also make sure that necessary steps are taken to prevent the rightists from taking over the government in Vientiane, during Souvanna’s absence. Alternatively, we should work out with Souvanna some way for him to be represented at Geneva without his having to leave Vientiane.
10. While all of these moves are taking place, we should proceed with despatch to strengthen the position of the South Vietnamese government along the lines we have already worked out. We should also endeavor to avoid discussing the Vietnamese problem in any international forum until the Laos situation is resolved—by which time substantial results should have been achieved from our efforts in South Vietnam.
11. Finally, we should proceed with our program of explaining to the American people what we seek in Laos and South Vietnam and the importance of maintaining a non-Communist position there.
[Page 190]Some Caveats and Some Cautions
12. In the last analysis, US objectives in Laos (and in South Vietnam) can be achieved only if the DRV is somehow induced to stand down its assistance to and direction of the anti-government forces. There are three main, conceivably inter-related, approaches toward accomplishing this: Hanoi might be persuaded in multilateral negotiations or by some direct deal; or Hanoi might be forced to yield by military means.
13. The scenario above proceeds basically down the negotiating track. It has many advantages (taking the negotiating initiative, meeting the desires of certain western allies and neutrals, seizing control of the time-table for Laos and Vietnam, exploiting present Sino-Soviet difficulties, demonstrating US strength of purpose). But it also presents many problems (the Thai and South Vietnamese concern about any Geneva Conference, the danger of a Rightist coup in Laos, the risk of the Communists fuzzing and indefinitely extending the Conference, the problems in moving US military units into Laos). Whether this course is one that should be pursued depends on the netting out of the advantages and the disadvantages and also on the promise that other courses hold.
14. A scenario for a direct deal with Hanoi has yet to be developed and will not be further discussed here. Although large scale military action against the DRV has been discarded, at least temporarily, there are many lesser military actions now under consideration. In considering the effectiveness of contemplated US measures to force the DRV into compliance, the French experience in the early 1950’s provides some perspective. By 1954 the French Expeditionary Force in Vietnam consisted of about 135,000 French and Foreign Legion forces. In addition, the French High Command had under its control 221,000 organized Vietnamese troops (about 160 battalions), 120,000 auxiliaries and many thousand of “suppletifs” roughly equivalent to the present SDC). By the end of the war, French air strength included 150 combat aircraft (plus another 50 from the aircraft carrier Arromanches) and about 80 transport planes.
15. This is not meant to imply that we couldn’t defeat the DRV with the same or even smaller forces. But it does indicate that reconnaissance flights (escorted or not), small teams of infiltrators, small-scale bombing (VNAF or USAF) of targets in Laos and even in North Vietnam are not likely to frighten Hanoi into complying with US demands. US Force movements will cause some breast-beating and shrill propaganda reactions, but even these are not likely to have much deterrent effect until they are actually used.
US Objectives—Another Look
16. The courses of action discussed above and many others, as well, relate to the US objectives spelled out in Paragraph 1. But, are we deluding ourselves? Should we lower our sights to a more realistic set of [Page 191] goals—more realistic in terms of our ability to achieve them with courses of action carrying less risk and smaller commitments? The fact is that some courses of action currently under consideration subsume objectives substantially more modest than those we thought we would attain through the Geneva Accords. For example, the idea of letting the situation in Laos stew along until and unless the Pathet Lao pushed down the Mekong has its attractions, but we should not pursue this course unless we are ready to adjust our objectives. In short, we must put the cart and horse in their proper places: Let us decide, first, what our current objectives are and then work out the scenarios for achieving them. Not vice-versa.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, June 1964. Top Secret.↩