Office of the Historian

458. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, February 8, 1964, 5:15 p.m.

3004. Cyprus. Yost brought SYG, Bunche and Rolz-Bennett up to date in general terms today on where Cyprus negotiations stand. Since SYG seemed apprehensive discussions with GOC for establishment peacekeeping force might be reaching impasse we reassured him that we remain hopeful of agreement within next few days.

SYG was pleased to hear that we wished delay SC meeting until we could come in with fully agreed plan which would be presented by GOC. He said he had given Rossides similar advice yesterday and had suggested he assure himself “four permanent members” are prepared to approve plan before it is submitted to SC. We emphasized our discussions with GOC are being carried out in London and Nicosia and not through Rossides.

SYG said points on which Cypriots seem most insistent are: [Page 977]

(1)
SC reso approving arrangements;
(2)
Some sort of continuing SC control of force so that it does not infringe Cyprus sovereignty;
(3)
Mention in reso of independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; and
(4)
Mixed force of NATO and non-NATO contingents.

SYG seemed sympathetic to all these points. We indicated some accommodation could probably be worked out on points 1, 3 and 4 but that continuing SC control of operation seemed to us wholly impracticable. SC would have to remain in practically continuous session and Soviets, as recent Kruschchev letter reveals,2 would use every opportunity to sabotage operation since their primary objective is clearly not, as our is, to keep the peace in Eastern Mediterranean and inside Cyprus. Bunche said Cypriots are fearful allied force not under SC control would settle down in Cyprus indefinitely and supersede GOC. We replied no one could or would remain in Cyprus without GOC consent and way would always be open for GOC to return to SC if arrangement did not work out to its satisfaction. SYG suggested force might be controlled in same manner as had UN force in Congo (i.e., by himself), but we discouraged this idea and argued only feasible direction was by force commander acting of course in consultation with GOC and other interested govts. Naturally SYG and SC would be kept currently informed by reports from force commander and UN observer.

SYG said he had also emphasized to Rossides that UN financing of force is totally out of question and force will have to be financed by those who participate.

Yost
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Received in the Department at 6:52 p.m. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE also for POLADs.↩
  2. In parallel notes to the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and Greece, the Soviet Prime Minister warned against establishment of a NATO force on Cyprus and expressed support for the government of Archbishop Makarios. Regarding the Khrushchev letter, see footnote 5, Document 456.↩