Office of the Historian

455. Telegram 1584 From the Embassy in The Bahamas to the Department of State1

Nassau, September 25, 1975, 1707Z.

1584. Subj: Facilities Negotiations. Ref: Nassau 1350 (191745Z Aug 75).

1. Following is text of letter no. Ext/C.80/15, dated September 25, 1975 from GCOB MinExtAff: Quote.

Excellency,

Supplemental to my communication to you of the 15th August, 1975 referenced Ext/C.80/15, I now have the honour to submit to you, for your government’s consideration my government’s proposals relevant to the financial terms and conditions the government would be prepared to agree for the operating rights and the facilities of your government in the Commonwealth of The Bahamas and within areas falling under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas.

Accordingly Sir, I have the honour to state for Your Excellency’s government’s consideration the following:

(I) The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas would wish Your Excellency’s government to agree that the consideration be in the nature of a cash rental payment of dols 5 million per year for the sites.

(II) The provision of economic, technical and security assistance in the total sum of dols 500 million U.S. dollars over a period of 10 years.

(III) That the consideration mentioned in (I) above and the economic, technical and security assistance mentioned in (II) above be effective as of 10th July, 1973.

[Page 1170]

Yours faithfully,

P.L. Adderley,

Minister of External Affairs unquote.

2. Letter vividly illustrates what I have repeatedly stated, i.e., that GCOB has grossly distorted assessment of value of facilities to U.S. Thus while I am not surprised at having received a ridiculous asking price, I confess that even I am a bit jolted by just how high that price is. Even as an opening negotiating ploy it illustrates a total lack of reality and, as such, is not in my view even good bargaining tactics. In any given negotiation one might hope to split the difference or even do better. In this case, the GCOB figures are so far out of line that the government would be placed in an embarrassing position if it ever became known what they asked as contrasted to what I visualize to be the upper limit of what we would be willing to offer.

3. I had previously arranged an appointment to see Adderley at 10:30 Friday morning. I had a number of things that I wanted to discuss with him and I had intended to include an informal probe designed to secure clarification and amplification of Adderley’s August 15 letter to me.

4. I intend to keep my appointment. However, when the subject gets around to the facilities matter, I intend to tell Adderley that I have transmitted both his communications to Washington and have no instructions in response thereto. However, I intend to express my own personal point of view to the effect that there is not a prayer of a chance that the U.S. quid will approach even a small fraction of the GCOB proposal. I will state that my personal view is that the USG is not in a position to secure congressional authorization for any economic or technical assistance. I will also state that even rental figure standing by itself will almost certainly be substantially more than USG would be willing to pay since in my judgment it would almost certainly be more cost effective under these circumstances to relocate bases elsewhere.

5. Depending upon Adderley’s response to my personal views and upon Washington’s reaction to above letter we can then formulate a formal response to the two letters from Adderley. My inclination at the moment, however, would be to make a direct approach to Pindling to be sure that he understands that if GCOB is really serious about the proposal they have now forwarded that it would be our intention not to even bother to enter into a renegotiation of the terms of our presence at facilities in The Bahamas but rather to discuss the timing of phase-out of those facilities. In this latter connection, by the way, I hope DOD will be doing some urgent calculations as to just how quickly we can phase-out if it comes to that.

Weiss

  1. Summary: The Embassy transmitted a Bahamian proposal that the United States pay $5 million in rent per year and provide $500 million in economic, technical, and security assistance over 10 years in exchange for the use of military facilities in The Bahamas.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750333–0140. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, DOD, and CINCLANT. In telegram 1350 from Nassau, August 19, the Embassy transmitted the text of a Bahamian note linking military facilities talks to economic assistance. (Ibid., D750286–1135) In telegram 1616 from Nassau, September 26, Weiss reported on his meeting with Adderley, in which the Ambassador gave his personal view that “there was not a prayer of a chance that Washington would be prepared to consider any economic and technical assistance” and that the Bahamian Government “might be under a false impression concerning the value of the facilities in The Bahamas to the USG.” (Ibid., D750337–0263) In telegram 234776 to Nassau, October 2, the Department reported that it was reviewing its position and probably would be unable to provide a more definitive response until at least the end of October. (Ibid., D750343–0202)

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