95. Memorandum From the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger1
SUBJECT
- Ambassador Strausz-Hupe’s Critique of our Consultation Practices (USNATO 3772 Nodis)
The Ambassador has sent in what may be a most damaging, and I think is also a misleading, critique of our consultation practices in the Alliance. On top of this, despite my repeated pleas, S/S has widely distributed this NODIS message, even though it refers to the quadripartite consultations.
Strausz-Hupe’s basic point is that we are cowtowing to the French and in the process are undermining the NATO forum and slighting the smaller Allies. The problem with his message—which he should not have sent in view of our talks with him in London, but should have reserved for oral discussion—is that it utterly distorts what has happened. It posits alternatives—either scrap NATO as a political consultative forum or give up other means of consultation—that are wholly uncalled for since it is quite possible and indeed desirable to use a variety of forums, as we have been doing to good effect.
What brought this on was the Scranton episode where USNATO in my view went further than it should have in insisting on a reinforced Council session and continued doing so even after our London talk. Scranton himself quite independently had sent in a message saying that it was a mistake to push him forward and that he was loath to risk what had become a much healthier US-European relationship in New York over the past few months. No doubt, our new instructions, confining Scranton’s participation to a luncheon, instead of a NAC, were embarrassing to USNATO; but the solution we chose still provides ample scope for intensive consultation on UN matters and USNATO’s proper role should have been to maximize that rather than to wail about the decline of consultations and the “rusting” of the NATO forum.
More basically, it is simply not true that the quadripartite forum and other special consultations have devalued NATO. Maybe the [Typeset Page 363] French want to do that, but we have made very clear that the whole purpose is to strengthen the broader consultative processes by some parallel work in smaller fora. And on the substance of issues, that is exactly what has happened: the French have been a lot more cooperative on a host of substantive issues, even if they are difficult about procedure. What is so baffling is that a sophisticated person like Strausz-Hupe professes not to see this.
This telegram, especially with its wide distribution will leak: it will reinforce politically inspired allegations about “secrecy” and about inadequacy of Alliance consultations. Needless to say this is particularly unfortunate since it is wholly unwarranted and turns on its head what has been a highly positive evolution over the past year or more.
I may say by way of additional comment that in my dealings with De Laboulaye on the Scranton matter, I explicitly refused to commit us to scrapping further reinforced NACs. This is in the record of the meeting. Moreover, your record on attending NACs (as well as my own and that of our colleagues) is a most commendable one. So is our record of consultations with the EC-Nine. All of this makes Strausz-Hupe’s complaint that much more incomprehensible.
I find this a most unhappy turn of events, the more so since this telegram can only be the top of the iceberg. Haig called this morning to report that Robert lectured him at length on the themes of this message and that it was evident to Haig that it represents a broader-based attack on the quadripartite forum and on our allegedly soft treatment of the French.
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Summary: Sonnenfeldt discussed a recent telegram from Strausz-Hupe concerning U.S. consultative practices with its NATO allies.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, July–Sept. 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Nodis. Urgent. Attached but not published is telegram 3772 from the Mission to NATO, July 5.
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