Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

96. Telegram 168395 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, July 7, 1976, 2359Z.

For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: NATO Consultations. Ref: USNATO 3772.

1. I read your reference message with some concern because I believe it misreads the situation with respect to our consultative relations with our allies. Our commitment to full and extensive consultations in NATO institutions, including the NAC, remains firm. We worked for the envigoration of this Alliance function from the first day the administration took office in 1969, at which time we found the Alliance in some considerable political disarray. Over the past several years, especially in the last two to four years, we have taken numerous initiatives in this respect; I personally have participated in several special NAC sessions and have gone out of my way to keep up Ministerial discussions and senior officers of the Department have gone to Brussels more frequently than ever before. After practically every diplomatic mission I have either gone personally or sent a representative to brief the NATO Council. So I think the record should be clear and there can be no suggestion of a slackening of our commitment.

2. We well recognize the desirability and need for the smaller allies to have a genuine sense of participation in the consultative process, which is precisely one of the reasons why we have supported the NATO effort in this regard. I should add that we have also made a special effort with the Secretary Generals of the past eight years to strengthen their position, seek their counsel and give them a special feel for the directions of our policy.

3. At the same time, it has always been clear that in some instances NATO fora will not be the most effective or sole means for exchanging views and bringing harmony and greater cohesion to the policies of the Allies. In these instances, we have used bilateral channels and, on particularly sensitive matters, we have consulted and sought coordination through meetings with my French, German and British colleagues. We cannot ignore the fact that the NAC machinery has on occasion been less than fully secure. Moreover, as a practical matter on issues that are outside the traditional treaty area, the NAC cannot easily function as a coordinating mechanism, even though it may be suitable for an exchange of information and views. This is particularly true on such complex issues as Southern Africa, certain aspects of the Middle East, North-South relations and various aspects of international economics, most of which have come into prominence fairly recently. On these matters, direct consultations with Allies are not a substitute for the NAC but provide the most effective means of working toward mutually supportive policies among the Allies which in turn finds reflection in the endeavors of the formal Alliance bodies. Indeed, it has been repeatedly made clear in the quadripartite discussions to which you refer that for our part we view them as providing additional cement for the overall Alliance relationship. This view is fully shared, as far as I am aware by the British and Germans.

4. As for the French, we have to recognize that since Giscard’s advent they have moved in major ways to be more cooperative on the substance of policies, not without being subjected to vigorous criticism on that account at home. The French have been concerned about compounding the domestic difficulties resulting from the gradual recasting of certain of their policies toward us and the Alliance if it is surrounded by excessive publicity and involves, in addition, the visible yielding on issues which since de Gaulle have been matters of “principle” for them. I believe that the substantially positive evolution of French policies thus warrants our displaying some flexibility on procedural matters; but I want to stress that at no time have we yielded on our own principles with respect to the role of the NAC. Thus, in working toward a compromise on the Scranton matter, we have never made the slightest commitment with respect to future reinforced NACs, or with regard to the topics which, in our view, may be properly taken up by the NAC. Moreover, the compromise in fact fully permits NATO to consult on UN matters, both formally and informally through the PermReps luncheon.

5. In sum, I do not believe that the stark alternatives posed in your message are warranted either by the course of events or by other considerations. The consultative process is complex and varied; various devices can and must be utilized—including, incidentally, our contacts with the institutions of the European Community—so as to ensure the results we seek on the substance of issues. Alliance cohesion, including the fostering of an increasingly cooperative posture by the French is emphatically among those results, but it must be recognized that on occasion that cohesion can better be advanced by means outside the NAC but which supplement and reinforce its work. As in the past, we will not hesitate to confront the French when this becomes necessary. But if so we must exercise care that the issue warrants it and that in the process we do not ourselves contribute to driving the French back into postures that could damage our own interests as well as those of the Alliance.

6. I understand you are planning to return to the US in three weeks or so. I think it would be a good idea for us to meet here at that time to talk over these ramified issues. I am most concerned that there should be no misunderstandings about our policy and above all about our determination that the very fruitful evolution of intra-Allied relationships of the last several years be continued.

Kissinger

1. Summary: Kissinger replied to Strausz-Hupe’s message on U.S. consultative practices with its NATO allies.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 6, Quadripartite Memcons, Feb. 1976–. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt; cleared by Hartman and Ortiz; and approved by Kissinger. On August 16, Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt, and Strausz-Hupe discussed possible next steps in improved NATO consultations. (Memorandum of conversation, August 16; ibid., Box 11, DEF 4 NATO) Sonnenfeldt’s September 15 remarks on this issue to NATO permanent representatives were subsequently characterized by Strausz-Hupee as “an effective basis for dealing with this matter in the period ahead.” (Telegram 5263 from the Mission to NATO, September 28; ibid.)