218. Response to Request for Intelligence From the Acting Assistant for Joint Chiefs of Staff Support ([name not declassified]) to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Murphy)1
SUBJECT
- Afghan Update (U)
REQUIREMENT
- For use at SCC Meeting2
1. (TS/[codeword not declassified]) SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN:
—It is estimated 100,000 Soviets troops are committed to the Afghan invasion. About 60,000 ground and air force combat personnel and some 10,000 support and advisory personnel are in Afghanistan. Some 30,000 troops are across the border in staging areas near Termez and Kushka.
—Current analysis indicates the Soviets have completed the first phase of their Afghan invasion. Their lines of communications are relatively secure and their base areas are fairly well established. A second, operational phase is expected in the near future with operations in contested areas, especially in the West and Northeast. As weather conditions improve, and more Soviet forces and equipment are brought in-country, these operations will probably be more extensive.
—Soviet casualties are difficult to estimate. Reports have placed Soviets killed in action as high as 1,500–2,000, with wounded at several times that number.
2. (TS/[codeword not declassified]) AFGHAN POLITICAL SITUATION:
—As evidenced by growing country-wide urban unrest, especially in Kabul, no major segment of the Afghan populace can be said to [Page 600] accept the legitimacy of the regime of the Soviet presence essential to its survival.3 The rebellion lacks coordination and a leader, but these shortcomings may be corrected with growing urban opposition.
—Babrak Karmal was last seen on 21 February. Rumors abound that he will abdicate, be replaced by another Soviet selectee, or be the victim of yet another coup. A military government is highly likely.
3. (TS/[codeword not declassified]) RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN:
—Following the Islamic Conference’s denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan became characterized by arm’s length dealings. Relations began to deteriorate with the arrest of Pakistani private citizens and detention of embassy officials. Propaganda directed against Pakistan by Kabul and Moscow has become increasingly hostile. In retaliation, Pakistan has increased surveillance of Afghan diplomats in Pakistan.
—Anticipating the Afghan government will use Pakistan as a scapegoat for recent disorders in Kabul, Islamabad has ordered the closure of Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul and Consulate in Kandahar.
—Severance of diplomatic relations, which is apparently the Pakistani intention, would be consistent with last month’s Islamic Conference resolution. It would also be prudent in light of the recent direction of relations, and the increased prospect of Afghan harassment or reprisals against Pakistani’s in Afghanistan. Conversely, such a break may confirm Afghan suspicions that Pakistan’s intentions are hostile. Should relations be severed, the danger of border clashes is likely to increase substantially.
- Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, Background Paper for new DJS. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].↩
- This is presumably a reference to an SCC meeting held the same day in the White House Situation Room. According the summary of conclusions of the meeting, the SCC agreed on two goals with regard to Afghanistan: 1) “to make the Soviets pay a price for Afghanistan and to prevent their driving wedges among the allies;” and 2) “to maintain pressure to gain Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, holding out an acceptable political scenario.” (Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 109, SCC–248, 2/26/80, Iran & Afghanistan)↩
- See Document 217.↩