219. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Afghan Muslims (U)

We should be careful in implying blank endorsement to the Muslim forces in Afghanistan. First off, some of the groups are obscurantist at best; most of them are quite literally reactionary. They have some noble aspects and nobody who hates Russians can be all bad; nonetheless, they tend to be a pretty ugly bunch. I shudder to think of the human rights problems we would face if they came to power. Second, by emphasizing the Muslim aspect, we are scaring the Indians—and perhaps the Soviets counterproductively.2 Third, there is no reason to assume that these people like us much more than they do the Soviets. They are quite likely to take a Khomeini approach—or perhaps emulate the theology of the fellow who tried to seize the Mecca mosque. Finally, we get more than occasional reports that at least some of the insurgents inside the country are very anti-American because they think we aren’t helping them. (S)

Obviously, there is nobody in Afghanistan to deal with except Muslims and we certainly want to support their right to exercise their religion freely (as long as I don’t have to be around while they are doing it!). We do not, however, need to convey the idea that we want to see Afghanistan handed over to Muslims qua Muslims. If that unhappy land is to regain any kind of order, it is more likely to be from semi-secularists such as the royal family and any of the “modernizers” who are still alive. (S)3

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 2/80. Secret. Sent for information.
  2. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin beside this sentence.
  3. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin beside this sentence and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “that’s half the issue right now. The pt. is to mobilize Moslem forces there and elsewhere. ZB.”