Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

236. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 18, 1980, 9–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran/Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher
  • Harold Saunders

• OSD

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • Lt. General John Pustay

• Justice

  • John Shenefield*

• CIA

  • Frank Carlucci

• Treasury

  • Robert Carswell*
  • Robert Mundheim*

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Hedley Donovan
  • Joseph Onek

• NSC

  • Gary Sick
  • Marshall Brement
  • *Present only for Items 1–3

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

6. Afghanistan. The SCC reviewed a State Department paper outlining seven elements of a possible policy directed at achieving the neutralization of Afghanistan (attached).² Dr. Brzezinski said that two additional elements needed to be added: (1) Transitional arrangements on how stability would be maintained in Afghanistan during the turnover period if the Soviets should in fact agree to withdraw; and (2) Graduated steps spelling out how we get from here to there, i.e., how would we present this to the allies and to the Soviets, and how would we avoid getting involved in a negotiating situation on issues we would prefer to avoid. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that when he had presented some ideas along this line to Dobrynin, Dobrynin had remarked several times that that was not what they were hearing from America’s allies.³ Who was taking a different view? Mr. Aaron suggested that the original German paper, which had focused on possible concessions to the Soviets to get out of Afghanistan, may have been the source of these reports.⁴ The French, Warren Christopher noted, had contributed to that paper. (S)

The SCC agreed that the word “prompt” should be added to the first element in the paper (“Prompt withdrawal of all Soviet military forces . . . .”). (U)

Mr. Christopher explained that the preparation of the attached paper had focused on the basic elements of a policy, and had not addressed a negotiating strategy. That was the reason why the two additional elements identified by Dr. Brzezinski were not included. The objective was to put together a reasonable policy package which would put the onus on the USSR. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that the seventh point was the most dangerous since it opened the possibility of negotiating with the USSR about security arrangements in the region outside Afghanistan. The SCC agreed that we should not initially raise this point with the USSR—at least not in this form—but that the principle was essential. It would be preferable either to redraft the statement or to hold it back for use if and when the Soviets introduced the idea of negotiating rights for themselves in the region outside Afghanistan. Warren Christopher thought it important to include this point in case the package leaked out. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if the sixth element did not get us involved in a negotiation about the location of the Afghan border. Although we recognize the Durand line, and we have recently reaffirmed that position, the Durand line is not accepted by the Afghans and some others. The SCC agreed that the sixth point should be made a footnote to the third element concerning non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. If asked, in that context, what borders would be guaranteed, we would indicate our recognition of the Durand line as the border we would recognize. (S)

With those changes, the SCC approved the elements proposed by the State Department. The SCC recommended seeking Presidential approval in principle of these elements before proceeding further. (C)

Approve the elements of the policy outlined in the attached paper, with the changes as suggested above.

As amended.⁵

The SCC then discussed how this policy could best be handled with the allies and the Soviets. Mr. Christopher suggested taking it to the other six allies first, getting their acceptance, and then deciding together how best to present it to the USSR. We may not want to seek out the Soviets, but let them come to us. Dr. Brzezinski said he would go over the points informally with Sir Michael Palliser when he met with him today. Mr. Aaron said we needed to think about alternative ways in which we might put the Soviets on the defensive. For example, it might be desirable to call for an international conference on Afghanistan, including the Islamic states, China, and others. Another possibility might be to go to the UN General Assembly. (S)

All agreed that we should take the leadership on this issue, and that we needed to have a well-defined strategy before taking it to the allies. A small group composed of State, Defense, CIA and NSC will meet to work out the next steps. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 111, SCC–290, 3/18/80, Iran/Afghanistan. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.
2. Attached but not printed. The paper listed seven possible elements to achieve the political neutralization of Afghanistan: “1) Withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan; 2) An Afghan government acceptable to the Afghan people; 3) No interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by its neighbors or any other state; 4) Non-alignment in Afghanistan’s foreign policy and permanent neutrality for Afghanistan, including the obligation to refrain from entering into any military alliance, and to refrain from allowing any state to have military forces or facilities in its territory except by agreement of the guarantors; 5) Guarantees by Afghanistan’s neighbors and other interested states of permanent neutrality for Afghanistan and of non-interference in its internal affairs; 6) Agreement by the Afghan government and all guarantors on the definition of Afghanistan’s borders; 7) Arrangements apply only to Afghanistan and not to affect the sovereign rights of other countries.” Carter made three notations on the paper. He inserted “prompt” before “withdrawal” in the first item; he bracketed items 6 and 7 and wrote: “I see no reason to include these,” in the right margin; and at the bottom of the page, he wrote: “Presumption must be that Soviets will not withdraw under any circumstances, therefore, how to keep allies with us & win propaganda points.” These notations were also conveyed in a memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, March 19. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Mar 16–31) For the final version of the paper, see the attachment to Document 240.
3. See Document 235.
4. Not found.
5. Carter did not mark either option.