237. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
4364. Subject: (U) Another Look at Soviet Motives and Objectives in Afghanistan. Ref: 79 Moscow 28134.2
1. (S—Entire text)
2. Summary. The Soviet argument that their move into Afghanistan was necessitated by outside interference which threatened Soviet security through the replacement of a friendly regime with a hostile bridgehead on the Soviet Union’s southern border does not stand close scrutiny. Nonetheless, the Soviets were genuinely concerned that internal instability in a bordering country, with a Marxist government, if allowed to continue, would damage Soviet interests and prestige. They undoubtedly suspected that the U.S. and China would eventually be tempted to exploit a sustained anti-Soviet insurgency, that Amin’s excesses were damaging the prospects for stabilizing the Marxist regime’s control of the country, and that Amin’s justifiable distrust of Soviet intentions toward him would tempt him to consider a sharp turn away from dependence on Soviet support with a consequent loss of Soviet prestige. They also recognized both the ideological difficulty of explaining the overthrow of a Marxist regime by an Islamic fundamentalist movement and the effect of such an event on Eastern Europe, the Third World and the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia. We have yet to see any hard evidence that the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan was part of a larger design aimed at the Persian Gulf, warm water ports on the Indian Ocean or the encirclement of China through Pakistan; but Soviet decision-makers were undoubtedly aware of the opportunities that a stable Communist Afghanistan, subservient to the Soviet Union, would create for future Soviet exploitation of targets of opportunity in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf area.
3. The Soviet minimal objective was therefore to secure a stable pro-Soviet Afghan state. Soviet forces were intended to secure the major population centers and transportation routes in Afghanistan, [Page 638] while the brunt of counterinsurgency operations would remain with Afghan armed forces directed by Soviet advisors and planners. Believing that U.S.-Soviet relations were worsening and U.S.-Chinese relations improving, even without Afghanistan, and that the U.S.-Iranian crisis would minimize the Islamic countries’ reactions, they were undeterred by potential damage to their international interests. The Soviets failed to foresee that their flagrant intervention would accelerate the disintegration of the Afghan Army, undermine Babrak’s chances of gaining broad public support, and give new impetus to the insurgency. They also seriously underestimated the damage to their relations with the West and the Islamic world, but we believe they would have not changed their decision to go into Afghanistan had they more accurately assessed international reactions. In sum, we see no evidence that the Soviets have abandoned their objective of establishing a stable, pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan through military means or that they are seriously interested at this time, in a political solution that would necessitate withdrawal of Soviet forces. They are keeping alive the possibility of negotiations, however, in order to deflect attention from their pursuit of a military solution, and are watching with detachment the West-West negotiations on neutralization and other political solutions, hoping that splits among the Western allies will widen and the U.S. will stand isolated in its measures taken in response to the invasion. End summary.
4. Two-and-a-half months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, many questions remain about Soviet motives and objectives in that country. Since submitting our assessment of Soviet motives immediately after the invasion (reftel), we see no reason to alter fundamentally that analysis. Nevertheless, the intensity of Soviet efforts to justify their move in terms of an alleged threat to Soviet security caused by U.S. and Chinese intervention on their southern border, the “signals” they are sending of interest in a political settlement, and the willingness of some third parties, such as India, to accept the plausibility of the Soviet version lead us to take another look at Soviet motives and objectives and to update our original analysis.
5. The Soviets, in public and private statements, adamantly insist that their only objectives in Afghanistan were and are the perpetuation of a stable, friendly regime and preservation of the social achievements of the April revolution. Soviet charges of U.S., Chinese and other foreign instigation of the Afghan Muslim rebels, if not made out of whole cloth, are at the least grossly exaggerated. Nonetheless, the Soviets have been deeply concerned about the steady growth of an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet fundamentalist Muslim and nationalistic insurgent movement in Afghanistan since at least the time of the Herat uprising in March of 1979. Unable to admit publicly the possibility of widespread [Page 639] spontaneous popular resistance to a Marxist regime, the Soviets at that time began to concoct charges of U.S. and other foreign interference. However, the Soviets undoubtedly did suspect that the U.S. and China could not be counted on to resist forever the temptation to exploit a growing anti-Soviet insurgency and that the Soviet Union, if it failed to act, would eventually find itself faced with a radical Islamic southern neighbor unfriendly to the Soviet Union and susceptible to potential overtures from the U.S. and China.
6. Soviet plotting against Afghan Prime Minister Amin in the months preceding the Soviet invasion has been well documented elsewhere, as has Amin’s awareness of Soviet attitudes toward him. The Soviets clearly believed that Amin’s excesses were primarily responsible for popular disaffection with the April 1978 revolution, that his removal was necessary to win the war against the insurgents, and that Babrak Karmal could be trusted to follow Soviet advice on broadening popular support for the regime. Moreover, the deep mutual distrust and suspicion between the Soviets and Amin must have caused the Soviets to consider the possibility that Amin, like Sadat and Siad Barre, would suddenly turn against them and order the Soviet advisors out of Afghanistan.
7. Either an insurgent victory or an anti-Soviet turnabout by Amin would have been a serious blow to Soviet prestige and foreign policy interests. Moreover, the Soviets would have had great ideological and political difficulties in explaining the replacement of a socialist regime by an Islamic republic, in contrast to the Iranian revolution which the Soviets portray as a progressive step from monarchy. Not the least of Soviet concerns were the potentially troublesome effects of the loss of a neighboring Marxist state, with which the Soviet Union had a friendship treaty including a security commitment, on Eastern Europe, other pro-Soviet “progressive” governments in the Third World and even on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia. Brezhnev has alluded to those concerns in a conversation with a Western visitor.
8. We do not accept the thesis occasionally mooted that the move into Afghanistan was a direct reaction to the NATO TNF decision or to the growing ties between the U.S. and China. But it is certainly true that the international situation at the end of 1979 was more propitious for a Soviet move into Afghanistan than it might be later, if the Soviets had let matters drift until they were faced with an imminent prospect of losing Afghanistan. U.S.-Soviet relations were already worsening as a result of the dispute over the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the U.S. commitment to increase its defense spending and its military presence in the Indian Ocean, the NATO decision on TNF rejecting Brezhnev’s initiative to forestall it, and rapidly improving relations between the U.S. and China. The Soviets thus saw poor immediate prospects for [Page 640] obtaining SALT ratification, MFN, or other forward movement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Believing that bilateral relations were unlikely to improve during a U.S. election year, they were undeterred by the danger of further damage to those relations. The Soviets were also aware that potential damage to their relations with the Islamic world would be lessened by Islamic attention to growing U.S. pressures on Iran, and that the possibility of driving Iran into a close relationship with the U.S. was foreclosed by the hostage crisis. Also, they have made a deliberate effort to deflect attention in the Arab world away from Afghanistan and onto the Palestine issue where the U.S. is singled out as the true “enemy of Islam”.
9. We have seen no direct evidence that the Soviet move into Afghanistan was part of a larger design to expand Soviet military power to the Persian Gulf, to gain a land route to ports on the Indian Ocean or to encircle China. For the time being the Soviets have their hands full in Afghanistan, but the achievement of a stable Afghan Government subservient to the Soviet Union would create future opportunities for expanding Soviet influence in Southwest Asia and toward the Persian Gulf that must have occurred to Soviet decision makers.
10. The minimal Soviet objectives in sending large numbers of Soviet combat forces into Afghanistan were to prevent an insurgent victory, to replace the unpopular Amin regime with a more representative leader, and ultimately to crush the insurgents and establish a stable pro-Soviet regime. Aside from removing Amin and installing Babrak in power, the principal mission of the Soviet forces was to secure the major population centers, roads and airfields. Babrak would thus be given time to broaden the revolution’s political base, while the Afghan Army carried out counter-insurgency operations under Soviet direction and planning. The Soviets handled the affair clumsily and miscalculated the effect of their action on Afghan nationalism. The invasion has accelerated the disintegration of the Afghan Army, increased the unpopularity of the Kabul regime, and given new impetus to the insurgency. The Soviets equally underestimated the long-term damage to their relations with the U.S. and other countries, particularly the Islamic countries.
11. We see no evidence, however, that basic Soviet objectives have changed as a result of their unexpected difficulties or that they are yet willing to withdraw without leaving behind a secure pro-Soviet Marxist regime. It is interesting that some of our official contacts with lower and mid-level Soviet officials have revealed a sense of miscalculation. For example, they have called the Afghan venture a “snafu”, a “mistake”, a move guided by the Soviet Union’s “pretensions”. However, the reasons which convinced the leadership to make its move are no [Page 641] less cogent now than they were before, even if the damage to their relations with others has turned out to be greater than expected.
12. While the Soviets say they were perfectly happy with their relations with Afghanistan before the April revolution, we see no possibility of turning back the clock. Antipathy to the Soviet Union and its ideology has greatly intensified in Afghanistan since April 1978 and particularly since the Soviet invasion. It is thus difficult to conceive of a regime friendly to the Soviet Union and preserving the gains of the April revolution which could survive without the presence of Soviet forces. Assertions, such as those by USA Institute Director Arbatov, that the Soviet Union could establish a stable, friendly regime within a few months, if outside interference is stopped, cannot be taken at face value.3 The roots of the insurgency are in Afghanistan itself, and the result of a Soviet withdrawal would be a Muslim victory or, at least, chaos and dismemberment of the Afghan state.
13. Meanwhile, the Soviets are keeping alive talk about a political settlement, but our impression is that this is simply a ploy designed to focus attention on alleged U.S. interference, defuse international pressures for a prompt Soviet withdrawal, take the steam out of the Olympic boycott movement, buy time for continuing military efforts to crush the insurgency, and preserve their options for the future. They seem to be watching with a certain detachment what one of our colleagues has termed the West-West negotiations on neutralization and other political solutions, hoping that splits among the Western countries will widen and the U.S. will stand isolated in its measures taken in response to the invasion. Only when, and if, they become convinced that they cannot achieve their objectives through military means will the Soviets seriously consider a political settlement that would bring about a Soviet withdrawal. For now, all available evidence indicates that they will continue to pursue their objectives through military means, even if this requires broader use of Soviet forces than they originally anticipated.
- Source: Library of Congress, Donated Material of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 1977–1981, Box 82, Afghanistan Neutralization. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Warsaw, Amman, Baghdad, Beijing, Beirut, Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Cairo, Damascus, Geneva, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Leningrad, London, Vienna, New Delhi, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, and USNATO. Printed from a copy received in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Message Center, which included additional handling instructions: “Military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive for Service Chiefs.”↩
- See Document 123.↩
- See Document 230.↩