26. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1

5670. Subject: Under Secretary Newsom’s Discussions in Kabul.

1. Summary: Under Secretary Newsom called July 13 on President Taraki, Foreign Minister Amin and Deputy Foreign Minister Dost. Afghan leadership emphasized desire for friendly relations with all countries and preoccupation with internal reform and development as hallmark of new government. They stressed intention to preserve Afghan independence and need for economic assistance from major powers. GOA does have differences with Pakistan and Iran over the Durand Line and the Helmand waters but desires peaceful solution and must study issues thoroughly before opening any negotiations. They expressed genuine desire for good relations with U.S. and want U.S. economic assistance to continue. Newsom thoroughly explained factors affecting U.S. ability to continue to provide help and conveyed U.S. desire that close relations continue as well as U.S. support for sovereign and independent Afghanistan. Taraki said GOA will follow policy of genuine non-alignment and will not allow foreign troops in Afghanistan. Puerto Rico, prisoners and narcotics also raised.

2. U.S. views: In all of his calls, Newsom explained that there were many questions in the U.S. about the policies of the new Afghan Government and he was here to obtain GOA views first-hand and to determine whether there would be any barriers to good relations with the U.S. in the future.2 He wished to convey U.S. desire to continue close relations and U.S. support for the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan. U.S. hopes the GOA will follow a policy of genuine non-alignment, otherwise, there could be difficulties in our relations.

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3. Regarding economic assistance, Newsom said the U.S. hopes to continue its long-time help for the development of Afghanistan. He noted legislative restrictions on aid to countries which are determined to be Communist and to countries which do not respect human rights as well as importance to our assistance programs of narcotics control and projects meeting basic human needs. There would be questions in Congress about continuing U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and we would have to be prepared to defend our projects. U.S. provides support to IFIs which sponsor large infrastructure projects. U.S. willing to pursue its assistance programs in Afghanistan provided USAID personnel are treated the same as others in terms of access to government, travel and general support. If GOA desires, U.S. is sympathetic to continuing its assistance in Helmand River Valley and could go forward with $3.8 million for this project. Newsom said U.S. is willing to discuss other projects in agriculture, health and education and noted possibility wheat project in Baghlan Province in northern Afghanistan. IMET and Fulbright program also mentioned.

4. Major elements of DRA foreign policy: All three GOA leaders stressed Afghanistan’s independence and its desire for friendly relations with all states, particularly the Soviet Union and the U.S. and Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors. Taraki said Afghanistan will follow policy of genuine non-alignment although this does not mean GOA will be silent on important international issues nor will it fail to react to “attack” from any quarter. At same time, Afghanistan has long history of independence and will not rpt not become subservient to any country nor allow any nation to interfere in internal affairs of Afghanistan. No country will be allowed to station troops in Afghanistan. Dost and Amin assured Newsom that Afghan revolution was internal event and that even Soviets were taken by surprise. GOA would be non-aligned and its long history of independence from foreign domination was example for other Asian countries. For its development programs, Afghanistan looks forward to receiving assistance from its friends abroad, especially the Soviet Union and the U.S.

5. Relations with U.S.: Taraki and others expressed genuine interest in continued friendly relations with U.S. (it was noted that three members of DRA Cabinet are Columbia University graduates). On assistance, Taraki repeated preference for commitment of large Soviet-style lump sum, commitment from which GOA could draw for projects of its choice. However, he indicated understanding of congressional appropriation process and asked for list of areas in which U.S. could assist so that GOA could compare with its requirements under five-year-plan now being prepared. Taraki said he would instruct his people to discuss details of aid program with Embassy Kabul. Taraki appeared uninformed on IMET program and said he would ask Minister of [Page 63] National Defense for briefing. He complained that Fulbright program requires “hundreds” of applicants for only five positions and said GOA prefers to name the scholarship recipients. Amin welcomed any possible U.S. assistance and expressed GOA willingness to discuss details with U.S. technicians. Regarding wheat project in Baghlan Province, however, Amin said that project would have to be reviewed in the light of the new land reform program.

6. Relations with Pakistan and Iran: Newsom expressed U.S. desire for continued peace in the region. While not wishing to appear as an intermediary, he noted Iranian concern over GOA attitude toward Helmand waters agreement3 and Pakistan’s concern over GOA intentions re Durand Line and Pushtunistan problems. He added that U.S. hopes to resolve problem with GOP over reprocessing plant, and, since U.S. provides assistance to both countries, we are interested in good relations between the two.

7. GOA leaders followed line that they want friendship and cooperation with neighbors and seek understanding of their revolution and technical and economic support for their development plans. Taraki said Afghanistan would not bother its neighbors (and commented sarcastically that if he must pray in a mosque or church to get help for his country he would do so). Amin said U.S. need not worry that GOA would cause tensions in area. Afghanistan would attack no rpt no state and would seek to solve problems through negotiation. Since regime is new, it will take time for GOA to develop its positions on Helmand waters and Durand Line, latter being historical problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He recognized, however, that problem does exist between the two countries over Pushtunistan and Baluchistan issues. This would have to be solved by realistic negotiations but Afghanistan’s domestic priorities for the moment are more important and it premature for GOA to raise this delicate subject with GOP at this time. On Helmand waters, GOA also needs time to study agreement and has asked GOI to observe status quo. Taraki also said these issues under study. He jokingly said after only two months in power that he has to study everything before deciding what to do. For example, he said he had never in his life been in the elegant room in which our meeting took place and he needed to learn way around it and then gradually acquaint himself with the issues facing his government.

8. Party-to-party relations: Newsom carefully explained to Amin that U.S. legislation contains prohibition on aid to Communist countries. While term Communist not precisely defined, Congress generally assumes that if a party in power considers itself to be part of the [Page 64] international Communist movement then that country is Communist. He noted that Khalq Party had not so considered itself in past but wanted to point this out as potential problem to U.S. assistance should PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) establish party-to-party relations with CPSU in future. Noting history of close Afghan relations with Soviet Union, Newsom asked Amin whether he expected party-to-party relations to develop. Amin said GOA will have relations with all political parties in power all over the world, such as the Democratic Party in the U.S., on the principle that parties in power should deal with other parties in power. He could not provide a further clarification at this time but stressed that what U.S. should consider is “what we are doing for our people not what we are.”

9. Domestic priorities: GOA leaders consider their principal tasks are to serve needs of the common man in an impoverished country previously exploited by aristocratic rulers. To meet their internal goals they need peace within Afghanistan and with neighbors and substantial foreign assistance. GOA is preparing five-year development plan which it hopes to have ready by first anniversary of revolution. GOA plans programs which will bring about basic economic and social reform, and GOA considers land reform to be its first priority. Both Taraki and Amin were asked whether cooperative or collective farms were envisaged. Both replied that small farmers would retain their land (up to two hectares) and would be organized into cooperatives. As first step in land reform, Taraki said GOA was about to announce program for graduated abolishment of debts owned by tenured farmers who had mortgaged their land to moneylenders and usurers.

10. Prisoners: Noting Borel visit, Newsom raised subject of possible release of imprisoned women and children related to officials of former government. Taraki bluntly replied that this was Afghanistan’s own affair and said “why shouldn’t I ask about the prisoners in your country?” However, Amin said they could not be released yet because their safety could not be guaranteed; he again indicated that there was possibility these prisoners could leave Afghanistan. When ICRC representative Borel visited Kabul in early July he visited prison but did not suggest release or departure for abroad. Borel was in Kabul again but Amin was unfamiliar with his activities.4 As for imprisoned officials of the Daoud regime, Amin said no decision on their future had yet been made by the Revolutionary Council.

11. Puerto Rico: Newsom noted to Dost that in 1977 Afghanistan voted with India, Iran and others in the Committee of 24 to set aside [Page 65] the Puerto Rican issue and explained the U.S. position.5 He asked that GOA give sympathetic consideration to continuing its policy on Puerto Rico. Dost replied that the GOA would study and discuss the U.S. request.

12. Exchange of new Ambassadors: Newsom expressed appreciation for the rapid agrément and presentation of Ambassador Dubs as the first new Ambassador since the change of government. Taraki warmly expressed his appreciation for the quick USG agreement for the appointment of former Interior Minister Noor to Washington.

13. Message to President Carter: At conclusion of meeting with Taraki, the President asked that Newsom reassure President Carter that GOA is a friend of the U.S., wishes to maintain normal political relations and to receive American assistance to help achieve its domestic development targets. Newsom told Taraki that he would describe the GOA position to President Carter as seeking genuine non-alignment, concentrating on the welfare of its population, and regarding international issues from standpoint of Afghanistan’s best interest. Taraki agreed, but added, we will, however, react to attacks from any quarter, would not accept any ultimatums and hoped GOA would not rpt not be “pushed” from its non-aligned course. If Afghanistan were, for example, attacked by Soviet Union, GOA would seek assistance from U.S. and any other friends. He had previously noted, however, that Soviet Union had had good relations with Afghanistan for sixty years and had not rpt not interfered in Afghan internal affairs. Meeting ended with Taraki firmly shaking Newsom’s hand in both of his and saying “our hearts and minds are for good relations between Afghanistan and the United States.”

Dubs
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780288–0783. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Islamabad, Jidda, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, and Tehran.
  2. Newsom visited Afghanistan as part of a regional trip, July 9–22, undertaken at Vance’s request. The trip included stops in Iran, India, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. He reported on his trip during a Presidential Review Committee meeting, July 27. Newsom noted that he had explained in meetings with Amin and Taraki that the United States wanted to maintain good relations with Afghanistan, including the maintenance of aid programs, but that the increasingly close ties between the Afghan Khalq Party and the Soviet Union could jeopardize ongoing aid because U.S. legislation prohibited aid to Communist countries. According to notes from the meeting on this problem, the committee members “agreed that there was not a feasible alternative to the course we are following.” (Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 70, PRC 067, 7/27/78, Newsom’s Trip re: South East Asia Issues) 22 USC 2370 (f) prohibits any assistance to Communist countries.
  3. Iran and Afghanistan signed the Helmand waters agreement on March 13, 1973.
  4. The outcome of Afghan leaders’ July 3 meeting with Dominique Borel, a representative of the International Red Cross, was reported as unknown in telegram 5452 from Kabul, July 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780275–1071)
  5. A reference to the UN Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. For U.S. policy regarding the Committee of 24, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976, Document 49.