Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

111. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 1, 1985

SUBJECT

• Sensitive Planning for Your Meeting With Gorbachev (S)

You have recognized for some time that in order to reach agreement with the Russians on some of the more sensitive issues (human rights cases, one or two bilateral matters and arms control) it would be necessary to establish direct communications with Gorbachev. You have taken the initiative twice to do so. Two years ago you asked Brent Scowcroft, who was on a trip to Moscow with a private group, to carry a message to Andropov.² Gromyko sabotaged that effort. Then last week in your one-on-one with Shevardnadze you proposed that such a direct channel be established.³ There are one or two signs that the Russians are taking this effort seriously. This memo summarizes these signals and makes recommendations for how you might want to have the US end of the dialogue handled. (S)

While in New York last week for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting, I had dinner with Henry Kissinger. Henry had been contacted by Arbatov—the Academician who heads the USA Institute.⁴ They met for an hour before Arbatov went back to the Soviet Union. According to Kissinger, Arbatov was speaking from a written brief and appeared to be under instruction from Gorbachev. His purpose was to probe for the basis for a compromise. It was interesting that he chose Kissinger who, as you may know, had just written perhaps the strongest defense of the need to keep SDI (published in the Post) of anything yet to appear.⁵ Arbatov wanted to know “. . . what do the Americans want. . . on arms control. . . ?” While disclaiming any authority to speak for the Administration Kissinger laid down two markers as “personal views.” (S)

—The Soviet Union cannot expect the US President to live with conditions in which the USSR maintains a first strike capability and the US has no corresponding offensive deterrent (which is the case today). (S)

—Nor can the Soviet Union expect the US to discontinue its strategic defense program, faced with the massive Soviet programs in both offense and defense. (S)

After some further probing, Arbatov focussed upon what possible outcome might be acceptable to you. Kissinger again disclaimed any authority to speak for you but said in his personal judgment, a joint statement which treated both offense and defense such as the following, would be the minimum that any President would need to insist upon. (S)

(With respect to Offense) Both parties would commit publicly to concluding within (6 months, or one year) an agreement providing for the reduction by both sides of ballistic missile warheads to a level of 5000 (give or take a thousand) with corresponding reductions in bomber systems. (S)

(With respect to Defense) Both parties would commit to engage promptly on a detailed exchange of views on the relationship between offense and defense with a view toward establishing how this relationship ought to be managed in the coming years (with the clear prescription that research and testing would be allowed). (S)

Arbatov stated that “I think we could come to terms on something like that.” This was an interesting exchange. One has to ask about Arbatov’s bona fides. It is not yet clear where he stands vis-a-vis Gorbachev. He was prominently present during the Time interview but he has a lot of detractors both in the government and the party. He may be trying to establish a basis for currying favor with Gorbachev, but a Kissinger connection would not necessarily accomplish that. If ultimately you decide to establish a private channel, I would not recommend that it be through Kissinger. (S)

A second interesting signal came after your meeting with Shevardnadze. Dobrynin contacted me Friday afternoon to ask what you intended in suggesting the private channel.⁶ He was no doubt angling for us to propose that he be the Russian point of contact. I demurred on how they would handle their side of it but said simply that you could envision that the several ongoing bilateral negotiations—not just arms control—might hit snags and that if so, it would be useful to have a means to quickly elevate the problem to the two leaders for resolution. I added that we would await their response and that you would decide how we would engage if they showed any interest. But the prompt show of interest reflects something new on their side. (S)

At this point we are in a waiting stance; Gorbachev could decide to propose various channels. It is likely that they will measure your seriousness toward the effort by the degree in which our side includes participation of individuals seen to be clearly representative of your thinking. In addition it will be important that the individual be knowledgeable in the technical matters to be discussed. You can choose from a number of candidates. In the arms control area Paul Nitze is probably the most experienced, although were he to go alone, the Soviets might see that as a downgrading of its importance. So you might choose to send Paul plus someone else. There are many options. I will discuss this with George Shultz and together we will make recommendations at the appropriate time. (S)

As a final point Mr. President, it will be imperative that this channel be absolutely private. This past Saturday the papers carried the details of the new Soviet proposal and it is my strong belief that the leak came directly from among your senior staff here in the White House.⁷ Consequently I have discussed this with no one and would propose that your final decision not be shared with anyone beyond the Vice President and the Secretary of State. (S)

You may wish to destroy this memo.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985 (1); NLR–362–7–39–6–4. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 193.
3. See footnote 9, Document 105.
4. On September 23, Kissinger reported to Charles Hill on his meeting with Arbatov. In the memorandum of conversation, Kissinger stated: “Our talk was so out of the ordinary that I thought I should report it to the Secretary right away.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP)
5. Henry A. Kissinger, “We Need Star Wars,” Washington Post, September 8, 1985, p. C8.
6. September 27.
7. On September 28, several news articles reported on the Soviet arms control proposal. Presumably McFarlane’s reference is to Bernard Weinraub’s article, “Soviet Reported to Offer 50% Cut in Nuclear Arms.” (New York Times, September 28, 1985, p. 1) While the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times also reported on the new proposal, Weinraub’s article repeatedly quoted an unnamed “administration official” and provided more particular details.