Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

80. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 29, 1983

SUBJECT

• Clark Group Meeting on Build-Down

Today’s Clark Group meeting, which followed your NSPG,² focused on a presentation which the NSC staff will make to the Scowcroft Commission and the six congressmen who have advocated build-down and other changes in our approach to START. The attached charts are designed to explain our START strategy and the concessions we have made thus far in the negotiations. It also contains the Administration’s version of the so-called eight congressional principles. Suggested changes to these charts³ have been provided to the NSC staff.

The charts on build-down and other START changes are not included in the attached package, but were presented as slides, and became the main focus of discussion during the meeting.

BUILD-DOWN

The changes in build-down are essentially as follows:

—Establish a working group within the START negotiations to work out the details of build-down.

—Develop a build-down annex to our draft treaty.

—With regard to missile warheads, there will be a percentage annual build-down in START and a build-down based on agreed ratios derived from the modernization program, encouraging stabilizing systems. The rule used will be that resulting in the lowest warhead number. (What this means is that modernization would only drive build-down, if the required modernization reductions were greater than the mutual annual percentage reduction.)

—Bombers—We will limit platforms and ALCMs in the treaty and discuss a platform build-down.

—Destructive Potential—We will explore destructive potential build-down once we know the Soviet build-down position. (To some “destructive potential” means missile throw-weight; to others it includes bomber capacity.)

—Continue the work program on build-down.

There were two contentious points. Ambassador Rowny was extremely upset at the prospect of having to negotiate terms of reference for a working group. He prefers simply to present a build-down concept and have the latitude to determine in what way it is handled. He fears that the Soviets will seize on the working group idea to block discussions of other ideas. NSC intention had been to convey the impression of putting the build-down concept into effect immediately, while protecting the main START elements by relegating build-down to a working group. I anticipate the working group idea will fall out of the final product.

The other issue of concern was the idea of a modernization trigger for build-down. Most are opposed because of the verification, definitional and conceptual problems with this approach. While I am not enthusiastic about the idea, we can probably surround it with adequate protective qualifications as long as it is kept within the START treaty concept. However, some would disagree. Apparently the NSDD will have a number of qualifications that will make the modernization provision seem less forward leaning and Rowny will have the flexibility to initiate discussion with the percentage annual build-down idea. (I understand that the choice was among some idea of a modernization “trigger” and some rather dramatic alternatives.)

OTHER START CHANGES

Although there allegedly have not been any final decisions on the three main issues discussed at your NSPG, we anticipate changes in our START position will be part of the presentation. In addition, the briefing will indicate that a “delegate at large” will be added to the negotiating team (current focus is on Jim Woolsey, who was Deputy Secretary of the Navy in the Carter Administration and is a very active member of the Scowcroft Commission). Reportedly, there has been no decision on the proposal to modify the GAC structure and membership, but that is likely to be part of the package.

Finally, the presentation pledges continuing pursuit of progress in START by:

—Pressuring the Soviets in Geneva.

—Pressuring the Soviets in high diplomatic channels.

—Exploring with the Soviets more explicit trade-offs between the areas of US interests and the areas of Soviet interests to balance destructive capability within asymmetrical forces. The latter point apparently is designed to reflect a desire for further development of diverse concepts such as the framework bridging plan and the Kent proposal. Reportedly, it is the President’s own formulation, and reflects his interest in this issue sparked by your discussion on Sunday.⁴) It was emphasized that in pursuing these concepts we would not abandon our principal START objectives. There will probably be some modification of the words “exploring with the Soviets more explicit trade-offs” since it worries Rowny and we must first do the necessary homework.

It is anticipated that the Scowcroft group will endorse the general concept and either write a report or a letter back to the “six” on these issues and the problem of conducting negotiations within a democracy. There was some discussion about how to obtain a commitment of support for MX and our approach to arms control from the six congressmen. During the course of the deliberations, principal focus will be on sustained support for MX.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1983 START Sept. Secret; Sensitive. Eyes Only. Copied to Dam and Eagleburger. A typed note at the top of the memorandum reads: “Pouched to NY 9/30. bdf.”
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 2:12 to 3:02 p.m. No minutes of this meeting were found. An agenda, draft talking points, and background papers are in the Reagan Library, Lehman Files, START (9/29/83) (1/2). Later that day, Reagan wrote in his diary: “P.M. Margaret Thatcher arrived. She & I had an hours talk before lunch mainly about the Soviets & what it would take to get back into some kind of relationship. Then we continued on a number of subjects at lunch. I don’t think U.S.-U.K. relations have ever been better. After she departed we had a Nat. Security Planning Group meeting re the START talks. We agreed on some strategy as Gen. Rowny prepares to leave for Geneva.” (Reagan Diary, September 29, 1983)
3. Attached but not printed are draft briefing charts.
4. September 25.