65. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant (Ehrlichman)1
SUBJECT
- Proposals for the State of the Union Message
The President, in his memorandum of November 5 calling for proposals for the State of the Union message,2 stated that “it is highly important that we outline our approach to the course we believe our country should take in the years ahead. We must make an imaginative and compelling statement of our objectives and purposes.” To that end, I should like to submit the following suggestion for the foreign policy portion of his message.
Proposal:
That the President make a statement explaining and expanding what has become known as the Nixon Doctrine3 for Asia to the less developed countries of the world.
Explanation and Justification:
The President, in his press conference on February 6, 1969, said, “I think you could describe me best as not being a half-worlder with my eyes looking only to Europe or only to Asia, but one who sees the [Page 141] whole world. We live in one world and we must go forward together in the whole world.”4
The impression is rather widely held, however, that Viet-Nam and related Asian issues have preoccupied the Administration and have overshadowed the problems of our relations with other areas. The news media, both American and foreign, by their own concentration on the war, the peace efforts and the demonstrations, have contributed to this view and to obscuring the fact that our new Asian policy is closely related to the policies developed for other areas.
Contrary to the misunderstanding of some of the press and public, a close examination reveals that there is an impressive, compelling consistency and logical imperative between the Nixon Doctrine for Asia and the President’s statements of U.S. policy toward Europe, Latin America and Africa. While it has gone largely unnoticed by the press, the underlying principles are the same, the style and approach to be followed are identical, and the long-range objectives for those areas are consistent and mutually supporting.
The fact that the President does see the world “whole,” and that he has fashioned a foreign policy to take the U.S. with our friends and allies “forward together in the whole world,” could be dramatically and clearly demonstrated by a Presidential declaration extending the Nixon Doctrine into a major thrust in foreign affairs.
A statement by the President to this effect might appropriately include the following principles:
1. We recognize that national pride is the dominant factor in nation building, and we affirm our respect for the identity and national dignity of all nations.
2. We are dedicated to improving the quality of life, but we recognize that each nation must achieve its own development in terms of its own traditions and values. We stand ready to help where we are asked and where developing nations themselves are moving ahead.
3. While “lecturing less and listening more” we will count upon the constructive cooperation of our friends and allies.
4. We are prepared to lend support, along with other economically developed nations, to regional organizations or through multilateral arrangements where our support is sought for constructive proposals.
5. We recognize the primary responsibilities of other states for their affairs—for development, security and military defense. We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and when we find it essential and in accordance with our treaty commitments. [Page 142] But we shall look to any nation directly concerned or threatened to assume the primary responsibility. “The defense of freedom is everybody’s business—not just Americans’ business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened.”5
6. Our policies will seek to lessen the dependence of other nations upon us and reduce the need for American support.
7. While aid is temporarily necessary, trade is essential in development, and we shall press for a liberal system of tariff preferences to be extended to developing countries. We shall take the lead in international forums in seeking to reduce some of the non-tariff barriers maintained by industrialized countries that affect the opportunities of the developing countries to export their products and also seek Congressional approval of unilateral reductions in our import tariffs on a variety of products of special interest to developing countries.
Advantages:
A Presidential statement extending the Nixon Doctrine beyond the confines of Asia would, in our opinion, have the following positive results:
1. It would show that the U.S. is pursuing a logically integrated, coherent and consistent foreign policy toward the non-Communist countries of the world.
2. It would increase the understanding and respect of both Americans and foreigners for our foreign policy.
3. It would make clear that we are concerned for the people of all less developed countries, and that we do not favor one at the expense of others.
4. It would reassure American citizens and our friends abroad that we seek to avoid future wars like Viet-Nam, but that we are not withdrawing from our role as a major world power into a shell of isolationism.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]. Confidential. Haig sent a copy of the memorandum to Kissinger under a January 9 note, commenting: “The attached memorandum from Frank Shakespeare reflects our failure to get our policy across even to our own bureaucracy. I must say I consider it a little bit presumptuous of Frank to delve into your woodpile to the extent that he has in this memorandum. I think the President has quite clearly, and certainly you have, broadened the Nixon Doctrine beyond the confines of Asia as it pertains to the LDC’s. I suppose there is no value in doing anything with this, however.” Haig appended the following handwritten notation: “I have talked to Shakespeare about Kirk Douglas[.] he will be back on this. Al.” Kissinger wrote in the top right-hand corner of Haig’s note: “Shakespeare is a blowhard. HK.” (Ibid.) Herschensohn met with Douglas on February 9; for his account of this meeting, see Document 72.↩
- Not found.↩
- En route to Asia in July 1969 (see footnote 5, Document 32), the President met with reporters on Guam on July 25. On a background basis, Nixon outlined what would become known as the Guam Doctrine and later the Nixon Doctrine. In reference to the U.S. role in Asia, he indicated that the United States would stand by its treaty commitments, but would expect that Asian nations would shoulder their own defense burdens. For additional information on the Nixon Doctrine, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 29, and Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 544–556.↩
- For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 66–76.↩
- Nixon made this statement in his November 3, 1969, speech; see footnote 2, Document 45.↩
- Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature.↩