Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969-1972

66. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Loomis) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 13, 1970

SUBJECT

• PsyWar Operations Against Vietnamese Communists

As requested in your memorandum of December 15, 1969,² to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the attached assessment of programs designed to affect morale of the Communists and Communist sympathizers in Viet-Nam is submitted.

The assessment was prepared in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC); the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), Saigon; and the Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam (MACV). It was coordinated with the Department of Defense, which is submitting a separate but similar document.³

Because he is out of the country, Mr. Shakespeare has not read the assessment.

Henry Loomis⁴

Attachment

Assessment Prepared in the United States Information Agency⁵

Washington, January 1970

[Omitted here are the title page and the table of contents.]

SUMMARY

The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) inducement campaign has been a solid success in 1969, producing over 47,000 defectors. The ralliers have provided crucial intelligence and other aid to Free World Forces, and these defections are a major concern to the Communist leadership. Yet the inducement campaign to defect, surrender, or desert, while singularly effective against Viet Cong (Southerners), has had little effect against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).

The leaflet campaigns along the Lao trail and border areas of Cambodia appear to be very useful. But the Cambodia effort lacks continuity because of recurrent unfavorable wind conditions and Sihanouk’s prohibition against overflight. Reward programs for delivering enemy weapons have been partially successful. Efforts to play on North-South regional prejudices in enemy ranks have been cautious, subtle and almost exclusively covert.

Now that enemy forces are predominantly North Vietnamese, two appeals are becoming stale: (1) the appeal to rally seldom affects North Vietnamese soldiers because their relatives are in the North, not the South; and (2) the appeal to surrender under slackening battle situations is not compelling, as the NVA often retreats to sanctuaries. Therefore, it would appear necessary to expand and sharpen communication with Communist forces, particularly NVA, in sanctuaries or on the trail, where war-weariness and opportunity for reflection can be exploited.

For the past fifteen months, there has been no overt program directed specifically at North Vietnam. This is the largest gap in GVN–US PSYOP in Vietnam. The only means of addressing North Vietnamese targets is via radio. The Voice of America (VOA) can be heard in NVN by very limited but important audiences 10 hours daily, but its message is directed to all Vietnamese, and often in the Southern dialect. We have some indications that information received from VOA and the BBC is circulated orally in North Vietnam.

An intensive and extensive all-media campaign, based on political, military, economic, and social progress in South Vietnam, continues with growing success to foster mutual support between the GVN and the SVN populace.

With the above developing situation, 1970 programs should serve three major purposes: (1) weaken the resolve of enemy forces, especially the NVA; (2) mobilize politically the population in South Vietnam; and (3) open additional communication with the North Vietnamese people.

Specific suggestions for improving our PSYOP include: (1) in inducement programs, increase the proportion of desert/fade-away appeals, (2) in output to NVA and NVN, stress the availability of peace on honorable terms, (3) expand air-drops over Cambodia, (4) increase air-drops over Laos, and (5) start overt broadcasts specifically to NVN.

With regard to Vietnamization, both the joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and the US Military Assistance Command (MACV) are beginning to devolve most of the total PSYOP effort on the GVN’s Ministry of Information (MOI) and RVNAF’s General Political Warfare Department (GPWD). JUSPAO has established some tentative dates for MOI’s assumption of responsibility for segments of media operations, and MACV is staffing a plan for the turnover of military PSYOP assets to RVNAF.

Major problems of Vietnamization are: (1) deficient GVN interest in PSYOP, (2) lack of continuity of MOI leadership, (3) a plethora of GVN PSYOP agencies, and lack of coordination, (4) the GVN’s difficulty in training and retaining qualified personnel, (5) possible misuse of information personnel for President Thieu’s personal benefit, (6) the scarcity of official printing establishments, (7) poor distribution of MOI funds to provincial offices, and (8) potential neglect of PSYOP against the enemy, owing to Vietnamese military PSYOP priorities.

[Omitted here are sections I. Appraisal; II. Improvement of Psyop Programs Against the Enemy; and III. Impact of Vietnamization on Psyop Programs.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]. Top Secret. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “Staff has action.” Below this, an unknown hand wrote “J. Holdridge.” Another notation in an unknown hand reads: “T.L. (info).”
2. See Document 61.
3. Not found and not further identified.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the assessment, which is entitled “Assessment of Psychological Operations Programs in Viet-Nam.”