793.94/3004: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
834. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser:
“Cecil reported to the Twelve this afternoon that the Drafting Committee had decided that if the commission were to have the confidence of both parties it must know their views especially as to its membership. It had accordingly asked the Secretary-General to get in touch with the two delegations. The latter reported that he had tried to do so but had found neither party ready to go into this question until the more immediate question of the Chinchow zone were settled. Both felt this to be the principal issue because only on the solution of which [this?] all else depended.
A discussion accordingly took place amongst the Twelve upon the Japanese aide-mémoire and Briand’s further verbal explanations. The latter pointed out that the chief Chinese difficulty seemed to be in conjunction with their demand for the inclusion of the system of observers which Japan had not been willing formally to grant. Briand had asked Yoshizawa if he could give some other guarantee before the Council which could not be represented as a third party, given the fact that Japan was a permanent member. Yoshizawa had cabled to Tokyo in this regard and finally received affirmative instructions. The Chinese seemed still to fear however that the proposal as represented would in effect take away from them the administrative control of the region. Drummond who had previously had a long conversation with Sze said that the Chinese preoccupation arose from the fear that if they were left alone face to face with the Japanese without neutral assistance, the terms would become constantly harder.
Madariaga was preoccupied lest the Council appear to give its sanction to a proposal which would destroy the last vestige of real Chinese authority in Manchuria. Whatever the origin of the present proposal, he felt its effect would be contrary to what the Council had attempted throughout to do. What it seemed to him to say was that the Japanese would agree not to advance into Chinese territory if the Chinese themselves withdrew from their own cities. One of its provisions seemed to do the very thing the Council had aimed not to do, namely, to legitimize the occupation until a final settlement was reached.
Neither Briand nor Cecil shared this view. The former stated that the Japanese proposal had been based on the Council’s action to prevent contact between the forces and establish a neutral zone, a proposal further amplified by Koo. The Japanese text spoke of the ‘maintenance of the Chinese administration in the evacuated zone’ which obviously could not be done if Chinese control were extinguished. Cecil pointed out that for 10 days the Council had been trying to organize a method for preventing hostilities and that during that time Koo had voluntarily offered as a representative of a sovereign government to withdraw his troops behind the Great Wall on condition of certain guarantees. The Japanese had liked this suggestion [Page 615] and offered a definite plan which seemed to Cecil satisfactory except for the one point that it did not fix a limit to the zone on the Japanese side. He thought it would help a great deal if the Japanese could fix a definite line, say the Liao, beyond which they would not penetrate.
The Twelve decided that, as the situation was both so important and so uncertain, the best course would be to ask Sze to appear before them at once. The latter in reply to a request for his opinion, at once put a series of questions to clarify the exact meaning of proposal. He noted that the Japanese accepted ‘the principle’ of the project; was that adequate? Briand thought that phrase did not diminish the importance of the agreement; the Japanese had accepted the principle because the details had not then been specified. He thought however those details had now been put forward in the Japanese aide-mémoire.
Sze then asked who was to decide if the circumstances mentioned by the Japanese were sufficiently serious to justify their entering the zone? Briand admitted that this last resort was one that had been faced throughout but pointed out that the possibility would exist only during the occupation, that it could eventuate only under the most unusual circumstances, that it would be controlled by the observers and that in these circumstances arbitrary action would hardly be possible.
Sze then read his instructions on what apparently was his principal point that the neutral observers must be maintained at all costs. Indeed the proposal could be carried out only with their presence. They must be on hand to survey the situation; the policing of the zone could be entrusted to a special corps directed by them. China was willing to go very far to avoid a conflict; if however Japan failed to accept some such basis as this and proceeded to attack, the Chinese troops would resist, and the responsibility would be Japan’s.
Briand however urged that the Japanese proposal was even more advantageous to the Chinese; it provided for evacuation on the conditions China habitually urged, namely, maintenance of Chinese authority and direct negotiations on security. He pointed out that when the Japanese had refused the intervention of observers the Council had tried to meet China’s difficulty and secure adequate guarantees for her in another way which had taken the form of an engagement before that Council. Such an engagement would have a very great value to China for though the observers would not appear in the agreement they would still in fact remain on the spot. Cecil agreed that the guarantees offered were very substantial and that the Chinese might feel entirely secure unless of course wholly unforeseen circumstances arose.
Sze raised the question as to the exact delimitation of the zone which Briand agreed must be settled. He asked what was meant by the ‘other details’ which were to be included and welcomed Briand’s suggestion that he would secure precision thereon. He also wanted to know exactly what the undertaking to be given by Japan would be and was assured by both Briand and Cecil that it would take the form given in the Japanese aide-mémoire. He asked if in case the agreement were adjudged violated the Japanese would go to the Council before acting on their own initiative and was informed by both Briand and Cecil that in such an event, the circumstances would certainly be so [Page 616] highly exceptional that Japan could hardly be expected to await an arbitration. The Council however would be the depository of the agreement; if it were ever called into question the Council would certainly act at once. Sze also asked if the security mentioned meant security in the limited sense and was assured that it did.
Finally, in connection with the issue in reference to North China Sze offered a new and interesting suggestion. In order to assume tranquility at Tientsin, he said he had been instructed to request the creation there of an international council at whose disposal China would place a battalion of highly trained treasury guards to be directed by foreign officers appointed by the Council but serving at China’s expense. This arrangement would cover the whole urban area and would again demonstrate China’s desire to do everything in its power to prevent an aggravation of the situation. Briand thought this suggestion very interesting but somewhat outside the immediate question of Chinchow. He considered it might best be handled directly by representatives on the spot.
Sze stated at the end of the meeting that he would refer all these points to his Government. Briand made a plea to him to give the project his personal support and attempt to secure the agreement of Nanking. The constant appearance of new problems and the unavoidable delay in seeking instructions from Nanking and Tokyo are however destroying the expectation of finishing the Council session this week.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Telegram in six sections.↩