793.94/3128
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador sent word that he wished to see me. When he came he began talking about the difficulties which had been created by the fact that the Chinese, after they had promised to evacuate the neutral zone in case the Japanese did so (as represented in the French note which he had left with me the other day46), now refused to keep their promise, and he told me that this made Baron Shidehara’s position very difficult because he was being accused at home of having tricked the army into retreating on this promise and now the promise has not been kept. The Ambassador intimated that it would be very difficult to withhold the army from advancing again. I at once took him up on the situation and talked to him very seriously. I said that if the Hon jo army should now advance again on Chinchow, after having been recalled, it would make the matter tenfold more clear to the American public that the advance was not to protect Japanese nationals but to destroy the last fragment of Chinese authority in Manchuria. I pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to ask China (which was evidently what he wanted me to do) to withdraw her own army from her own territory. I pointed out the entire absence of any reports of attacks on Japanese citizens in Chinchow and I said that under these circumstances if the Hon jo army moved again on Chinchow a very painful situation here in American public opinion would be created. I told him that even now the press were asking what we would do in such a contingency, and that the demand would be made a great deal more insistently if it happened. I pointed out in detail the long sequence of advances by the Japanese army, accompanied in each case by representations as to their purpose from the Foreign Office which had proved to be without foundation, and I said now this final advance would clinch the opinion of the American people that the whole movement since September 18 had been not to protect Japanese life and property but to attack the Chinese army of Marshal Chang wherever it could be found. I said further that under such circumstances it would be very difficult to persuade anyone that this did not amount to a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty as to the guarantee of the integrity of Chinese territory and of Chinese administration; also that it would be very difficult to deny that the provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact as to settling all disputes by no other than pacific means, had been broken.
[Page 630]The Ambassador said he had no intention of implying that General Honjo would advance at once. I then said that what I wanted to hear was that this Resolution pending before the Council at Paris had been accepted by Japan and had been passed by the Council; that there at least we would have one bit of good news. I reminded him of the importance of that Resolution in its effect on our public opinion, and the importance of an impartial investigation in Manchuria, and of a cessation of hostilities. He said that he thought we would hear good news from that in a very few days. I said that it might better be a matter of a very few hours, and I said further that if that Resolution was passed it would be far easier to reconcile Chinese public opinion to self-control than it would without that Resolution.
The Ambassador said something to me about the political difficulties surrounding Baron Shidehara from the attacks that were being made upon him to the effect that he had yielded to American pressure in causing General Honjo to withdraw. I told him that in my opinion Baron Shidehara’s difficulties were nothing like as heavy or severe as the difficulties which the Chinese Government were having in explaining why they should withdraw their own troops from their own territory around Chinchow when those troops were not engaged in attacking anybody else but merely were where they had a right to be.
In summary, I asked the Ambassador to urge most seriously upon Baron Shidehara the serious effect which any new advance by the Japanese army would have upon the public opinion of this country, and the serious thought which we were already giving that problem. In the face of it I stressed also the particular importance that surrounded a prompt and successful solution of the action pending before the Council of the League and an immediate passage of the proposed resolution.