793.94/3092: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
853. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser:
“The Drafting Committee met this morning with Sze to acquaint him with the changes suggested for the resolution and declaration as a result of the conference with the Japanese.
The principal question, Cecil stated, was as regards the relationship between the commission and the evacuation which the Japanese seemed to feel completely changed the character of the commission. All the [Page 631] other members of the Council, Cecil stated, were anxious that the commission should report on Manchuria first of all. If, however, they attempted to put the original phrase into the resolution the Japanese would vote against it. Similarly if, in order to obtain unanimity, they agreed on the modification the Japanese would demand the result would be so anaemic as not to meet either the Council’s views or the Chinese. It had therefore occurred to him that it would be better to put the phrase into the declaration as most convenient.
Sze explained that his instructions permitted him to accept the resolution and the declaration in their present form. His Government attached great importance to the particular paragraph of the resolution in question. He must therefore give serious thought as to whether he could accept the transfer to the declaration without reference to Nanking. He was very anxious for an early settlement but must keep within his instructions. Just what practical difference, he asked Cecil, would the change make.
Cecil thought the change would make no real difference in practice. The choice seemed to be between a weak phrase in the resolution or a strong phrase in the declaration. Juridically perhaps an order to the commission would be changed into a recommendation but in point of actual practice the result would come to the same.
As regards police measures Cecil explained that the Japanese had proposed an alternative text which the Council could not accept. This text would have given some confirmation to the theory that one country could go into the territory of another to do the police work. As the Council had not in any case liked becoming involved in this matter it had suggested dropping the phrase entirely from the declaration and allowing the Japanese to make their own declaration which of course any other member of the Council would be free to answer as he thought fit. He thought this suggestion would be in China’s favor though Sze did not comment in one way or the other.
Cecil then explained that the Council was extremely anxious to have the final meeting at the latest on Wednesday.48 The resolution was now complete, as regards the Japanese, except for the police clause. He had not formally proposed to the Japanese putting this clause into the declaration instead of the resolution until he had seen the Chinese nor would he ask the Chinese to give a final answer until he had a firm offer to make. Sze promised, however, to let the Committee know tonight what his view was.
In reply to Olds’ question as to the situation concerning Chinchow Cecil said he was not at the moment very happy about it. The Council had asked Japan what would be the delimitation of the zone on their side and expected to have a reply today. He pointed out that the two negotiations, that is, on the resolution and declaration and on Chinchow were quite distinct. The Japanese had not connected the Chinchow matter with the resolution. Cecil regarded the Chinchow zone as an additional precaution to avoid a clash; the resolution and the declaration would be just the same whether the Chinchow matter was settled or not.
Sze then gave his latest information on Chinese troops in that region. He said it was materially impossible for them to have gone [Page 632] as far towards Mukden as Japanese reports indicated if for no other reason than that the railroad is out of operation. The Chinese commanding officers had ordered not to attack but only to stay quite within the zone.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw