793.94/3094: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
855. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser:
“Briand reported to the Twelve today that Yoshizawa had brought him a reply as to the Chinchow zone (see my 854, December 7, 10 p.m.). He felt it would be very difficult to accept this reply; the situation created by it would be very different from that actually prevailing. The Japanese line would not be on the Liao as at present but very [Page 634] close to Chinchow. Drummond added first that the Japanese had confirmed by cable that it was Tokyo’s intention that China should be in control of the neutral zone, and second, that Japan did not propose that her troops should occupy the whole territory between the two rivers or be quartered beyond where they now are but that they should have the right to pursue bandits in that territory if necessary.
Cecil said that the line suggested by Japan passed very close to Chinchow. He did not see how Council could possibly suggest to China establishing a zone between the Great Wall and just beyond Chinchow. He thought the Council should reply to the Japanese that this would not be in accord with what was fair and just. More than that however he thought ‘the most vehement observations’ should be made by the diplomatic representatives at Tokyo; that the Council was satisfied through neutral observers and otherwise that the number of Chinese troops around Chinchow was insignificant, that there was no advanced movement by them, and consequently no danger from [to?] Japan. However diplomatically it might be put, he thought it should be brought home to the Japanese Government that an attack on Chinchow could only be considered as an aggression pure and simple.
Briand agreed that a communication be made stating what the observers had reported as to the lack of movement of Chinese troops and the lack of danger to the Japanese troops. The Council could then express the hope that the de facto zone which had been maintained so far with much success should continue. That zone had indeed made it possible to prevent hostilities; there was every reason for its maintenance.
Mutius remarked he had understood there was an immediate danger; was there any change? Cecil said he thought not; he was himself convinced that the Japanese military authorities were preparing an advance on Chinchow.
Madariaga reported a conversation with the President who presented two difficulties: first, as to the designation of neutral zone, with other territory which was Chinese; and second, as to the emphasis on direct negotiations. He would be glad to see the present situation continue but not under that designation. He would like to see the Council go ahead with the resolution which was broad enough to cover Chinchow and have both China and Japan make declaration before the Council that each would rest on its present lines with whatever reserve[s] regarding bandits were necessary and with a strengthening of the system of observers. He endorsed the idea of a strong note to Japan but suggested adding a constructive proposal.
Briand reiterated that in the present situation it was impossible to recommend the neutral zone as foreseen but the Council could recommend the maintenance of the present arrangement. Cecil agreed with this but thought it did not go far enough. He felt the Council could not neglect the warnings that had been given that a new advance was in contemplation. He could not help thinking that in proposing this line Japan meant to have it rejected. She could not have expected the Chinese to accept it. In his opinion the military intended to advance on Chinchow. There was no justification, military or otherwise, for such an act. He thought the Governments on the Council should urge their representatives at Tokyo to protest, in however diplomatic terms, against such action. What he feared was that the Japanese military [Page 635] do not think favorably of the resolution and think that a big incident at Chinchow would kill it. He felt it would be an outrage if Chinchow were attacked when the Council was at the point of success in its mediation. Briand added that it was clear what the Japanese reply meant, namely, the occupation of the whole of Manchuria.
A discussion then followed as to the exact form of procedure. Drummond had meantime prepared a draft which was accepted in general lines, rephrased somewhat in a subsequent meeting of the Drafting Committee and despatched to Yoshizawa tonight (see my 854, December 7, 10 p.m.)
The Twelve then agreed to announce a public meeting for Wednesday afternoon with the hope of final action on the resolution. Before then the Drafting Committee would meet with Sze tomorrow morning at 11 and the Twelve at 12.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Telegram in four sections.↩