793.94/3093: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

854. From Ambassador Dawes. The reply submitted by the Japanese to Briand this afternoon is as follows:

“The representative of Japan, in answer to the request which has been made to him by the President of the Council, hastens to furnish to him for his confidential information the following explanations.

1. The limit of the zone to be evacuated would, on the Japanese side, be established on the Hsiaoling Ho.

This limit has been determined on the basis of Mr. Wellington Koo’s original proposition in accordance with which the Chinese forces would retire from the Chinchow region to Shanhaikwan, and the Japanese forces would not enter the zone so evacuated.

2. The conversations to be undertaken with China could be very rapidly terminated. It goes without saying that during the course of these conversations our forces have no intention of entering the zone to be evacuated unless the Chinese should wilfully delay things in order to carry on hostile acts of provocation: that is a question of good sense and sincerity.”

This was not acceptable to the Council on the ground that it meant in effect practically the complete evacuation of Manchuria by China and would be wholly unacceptable to that Government. The opinion was strongly expressed by Cecil that there was some reason to think that it had been put in such severe terms in order to invite rejection by the Chinese and justify aggressive measures by the Japanese. The members of the Council thereupon decided it to be a matter of urgency to take two actions: first, for Briand, in their name, to write Yoshizawa for transmission to Shidehara as quoted below; and second, to request their individual diplomatic representatives in Tokyo to make strong representations against any measures which would further aggravate the Chinchow situation. These representations will probably follow the lines of M. Briand’s letter quoted below. [Paraphrase.] The particular request was made by Briand after the meeting that I be furnished with the text of this letter and that the suggestion be made to [Page 633] me that in the event the United States Government should feel able to do so its taking some similar action would be greatly appreciated by Briand. [End paraphrase.]

The Drafting Committee tomorrow morning sees Sze and a closed meeting of the Council will be held at 12 o’clock. A public meeting has been announced for Wednesday afternoon. I am to see Briand tomorrow afternoon and will wait until 6 o’clock Paris time, which is 1 p.m. Washington time, in the hope of receiving an answer to this despatch by telephone.

The following is Briand’s communication through Yoshizawa to Shidehara.

“I regret that after communicating with my colleagues with the exception of the representatives of the two parties, we do not feel it possible, in view of the information given to me confidentially by Your Excellency, particularly with regard to the limits of the zone, to make the recommendation to the Chinese Government mentioned in the memorandum which Your Excellency left with me on December 1st, though if the Japanese Government found it possible to make other proposals with regard to these limits, my colleagues and I would of course be prepared to reconsider their present attitude.

My colleagues and I are in any case convinced that the Japanese Government will respect fully the resolution of September 30th particularly so as to prevent say [any?] aggravation of the situation. It would be deplorable if, at a moment when an agreement is well in sight which we believe will be acceptable to both parties, the situation should be embittered and even endangered by fresh outbursts of fighting. In this connection I would draw Your Excellency’s attention to the proposal set out in my letter of November 29th and Your Excellency’s reply thereto in which it is stated that if a danger of contact between the Chinese and Japanese troops arose, the Japanese Government would be disposed to examine attentively the suggestions made to avoid such a contact.”

  • [Dawes]
  • Shaw
  1. Telegram in three sections.