500.A15A5/517: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 28—4:05 p.m.]
541. Your 300, October 24 [14], 6 p.m.; and 315, October 24, 9 p.m. The following “précis of conversation” was communicated by the Foreign Office this afternoon. It refers to the enclosure of my despatch 1760, October 17th.85
“The following is a précis of the statement made by the British representatives at their meeting with United States representatives on October 28th in reply to the précis of the statement made by the United States representatives at the meeting of October 17th. (The references which follow are to the paragraphs of that précis.) Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5. The British view is in agreement with that expressed by the Government of the United States. (This is without prejudice to the view which has been consistently held by His Majesty’s Government that lower qualitative limits for the capital ship would have been preferable had it been possible to secure international agreement for them.)
Paragraph 6. The British suggestion for a minimum displacement limit for capital ships at approximately 20,000 tons must be understood as a purely tentative one. The object, with which it is understood the United States of America Government is in agreement, is to implement a cruiser qualitative limitation by preventing the construction of ships in excess of that limitation which are, nevertheless, not capital ships.
Paragraphs 7 and 8. The British views are in agreement with those of the United States Government.
Paragraph 9. Since no existing modern 8-inch gun cruisers become over-age for a very considerable period, the British Government would be prepared to accept a general agreement not to build 8-inch gun cruisers at the present time, without prejudice to the question of the ultimate replacement of the existing ships.
Paragraphs 10, 11, 12a, 12b, and 13. Since there is no prospect whatever of an agreement on quantitative limitation by total tonnages in categories, the matters discussed in the five following paragraphs are, in the British view, somewhat academic. Subject to this consideration, however, the following remarks are offered.
Paragraph 10. The British representatives cannot offer any useful comment on the American Government’s proposal for a transfer system for solving the cruiser tonnage problem, since its acceptability must depend principally on the actual amount of transfer to be proposed and the categories into which it would be proposed to transfer. The [Page 133] British view has always been that transfer into higher categories from a lower and transfer into the submarine category are generally undesirable.
Paragraph 11. Though the present Japanese attitude, so far as we know it, is opposed to any arrangement for an agreement limiting naval construction by means of unilateral declarations for 6 years, it is still the intention of the United Kingdom Government to put forward this proposal for discussion in London, and only to abandon it if it is definitely rejected after further discussion.
Paragraph 12a. In the British view, it would be unfortunate if the American Government insisted on the view expressed in this paragraph that over-age and under-age tonnage must all be counted together. In particular, the over-age destroyer tonnage which the United Kingdom Government have in mind is only necessary for anti-submarine purposes, and to have to provide this tonnage in underage destroyers would be unnecessarily expensive. A more satisfactory solution, from the British point of view, would be reached if all overage tonnage were excluded from any future quantitative agreement. By this means the limitable fleets could be confined to under-age tonnage and the rate of replacement construction would be correspondingly reduced.
Paragraph 12b. While the United Kingdom Government see no objection to seeking a general solution of the problem of destroyer qualitative limitation by means of limited transfer, their information is that neither the French nor the Italian Government have any intention of admitting a distinction between the cruiser B, and destroyer categories. So long as other signatory powers refuse to admit this distinction, the United Kingdom Government must themselves refuse to be bound by it.
Paragraph 13. In the absence of any prospect of quantitative limitation by total tonnages in categories, a ratio between the submarine and destroyer tonnage remains an academic matter. The British view would probably be that, in negotiating figures to be inserted in the treaty, it would be undesirable to adopt a definite numerical ratio of this kind. If, however, the proposal were directed toward transfer between the two categories, within tonnage limits which had been agreed for insertion in a future treaty, there would be less objection to a hard and fast ratio.
Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, and 17. The British views are in agreement with those of the Government of the United States.”
The British stated that they agreed that the principle of parity as between the British and American Navies should be continued unimpaired. This was a reiteration of a voluntary and previous statement to this effect made by them on October 17 when they stressed their desire and understanding that nothing would in any circumstances be done by either country to disturb the continuance of the principle of parity. Referring to the prospective conference, the British stated that they were informed by the Japanese Chargé that if an attempt were made to proceed at the outset with qualitative limitation, they would come up against a blank wall, and that therefore it would be necessary first to undertake arriving at an agreement on quantitative [Page 134] limitation at the same time as qualitative even though this should prove unsuccessful. The British indicated their belief that then the Japanese would be prepared to discuss qualitative limitation. Referring to the British proposal for an agreement limiting naval construction by means of unilateral declarations for 6 years, the British expressed the belief that this would probably be opposed by France and Italy, as well as by Japan. It is evident the British feel there is slight prospect of any agreement on quantitative limitation. In referring to the continuance of the principle of parity as between Britain and America, the British stated that if there were no other quantitative agreements parity should nevertheless continue, and that probably the only feasible way to assure it would be for a full, complete, and frank interchange of information between the two countries as to prospective and actual naval building. They referred to the importance of a possible agreement by all nations to give such advance notice even though no other quantitative agreement could be arrived at. They also stressed the importance of a continuance by the Japanese and other countries of such notification of contemplated building as is required by existing treaties, should no other quantitative agreement be possible.