Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, General, The Near East and Africa, Volume I

500.A15A5/518: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

London, October 28, 1935—8 p.m.
[Received October 28—6:50 p.m.]

542. Personal for the President. The following are entirely British views authoritatively recounted to me and are transmitted in reply to your inquiry (No. 317, October 25, 7 p.m.).

In the British view, the projected Naval Conference, the initiative for calling which was left with the British and the convening of which they consider mandatory under the Washington and London Naval Treaties, is an expedient dictated by these and other circumstances. The British obviously do not expect that this conference will achieve important positive results. They regard it rather in the nature of a rearguard action to salvage as much as possible of the benefits of the terminating treaties, and as a means of permitting a continuation of recent conversations under the terms of reference of the treaties which expire on January 1, 1936,^85a thus preventing the Japanese from escaping from this treaty obligation and only entering into any new conversations after January 1, 1936, under conditions which they themselves impose. While some measure of qualitative progress may be made, any quantitative agreement is by no means expected to go beyond the French préavis thesis, and in this latter eventuality the British would not be willing to tie themselves up for more than 6 months. They do not expect that the Japanese will make a formal agreement even on such a limited quantitative basis as this. However, if the Japanese will agree even to continue notification as required by existing treaties, the British would regard that as a positive contribution.

I am informed that the considerations which commended themselves to the British in suggesting that the discussions be conducted under diplomatic auspices are as follows:

(1) This routine method of handling the question would reduce to a minimum false hopes of extensive accomplishments;

(2) It is expected that the discussions may be protracted, and this routine method will in the British view, permit a minimum of publicity. The Conference will open on December 2nd and after a series of meetings will adjourn for the Christmas holidays. The interval before a formal reassembly of the Conference will permit a continuance of recent conversations, mainly arising out of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Consultations with other European naval powers, such as Germany and Russia, may even at some point be considered desirable.

(3) In view of public opinion in Japan it would be difficult for the Japanese Government to send a national delegation. Although the Japanese Government has not formally accepted the invitation, Hirota⁸⁶ has informed the British Ambassador in Tokyo that if Ambassador Matsudaira does not reach London by December 2, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris will take his place temporarily.

(4) In view of the Italian crisis, the British consider the routine method the more desirable, particularly because of the limited results anticipated.

Important publicity in the British view was justified in the other naval conferences where the possibilities of achievement were far greater than in the present instance. The method suggested by the British would not, in their view, in any way prevent the visit to London of the Cabinet Ministers of the respective Governments for consultation, if during the course of the conference the deliberations, particularly from a European angle, assume unforeseen importance. Thus, while I am given to understand that the French Ambassador will head the French delegation, this does not shut the door to the possibility that the French Minister of Marine might, if circumstances require it, make a flying visit to London for discussion and clarification of the issues involved in the British-German-French naval question. I also understand that the High Commissioners of the Dominions in London may, in their Governments’ decision, attend the formal meeting. No further reply has been received from the Italians beyond their statement of a fortnight ago that they would attend a conference.

The foregoing are British views on which I have no comment to make; but as regards the general subject of naval negotiations, it has been my personal attitude for the last 18 months that it would prove unprofitable to us to attempt to force issues or the pace, and subsequent events have not seemed to indicate that a revision of this attitude is now called for. If, as I understand it, we are definite as to our position, and there is no reason why we cannot, if necessary, announce our position at any time, then I feel that at this juncture it would be a mistake from more than one point of view to give the appearance that we are prepared to negotiate concessions when in fact we are determined—and I think rightly—to hold to our main purpose.

My 541, October 28, 7 p.m., makes it clear that we have now for all practical purposes reached complete agreement with the British on the stipulations contained in the Department of State’s cables Nos. 300, October 14, 6 p.m., and 315, October 24, 9 p.m., on naval details.

Furthermore, it will be noted that the British particularly stress in their reply their concurrence in the principle of parity. I have also forwarded to the Department of State a copy of a memorandum of conversation⁸⁷ indicating that Mr. MacDonald’s assurances of last year to me on ratios remain the policy of Mr. Baldwin’s Government. Thus, we are in substantial agreement both as regards principle and relevant details.

Incidentally if, as is expected, the National Government is returned to power, its mandate for rearmament will greatly strengthen Great Britain’s hand in its dealing with Japan. It will at the same time, in due course, force Great Britain to take a more active attitude, vis-à-vis Japan on naval questions. If we bide our time we will not be singled out for Japanese antagonism and Japan will have the benefit of knowing that absolute abandonment in practice of the ratio system will meet resistance from not one but both interested parties.

Bingham

1. See London Naval Treaty signed April 27, 1930, article 23, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, pp. 107, 123–124.
86. Koki Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
87. Report No. 777, July 26, from the Naval Attaché to the Navy Department, transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1593, July 26, 1935, not printed (500.A15A5/449).