Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

43. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)¹

Washington, January 16, 1951.

SUBJECT

• NSC 10/3

I think you will find the attached file² to be self-explanatory and I believe that you will desire to review it before the Under Secretary considers signing the attached draft memorandum addressed to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr. The following considerations with respect to NSC 10/3 have been suggested to me within the Department:

1. The document as presently worded does not sufficiently assert Department of State responsibility, authority and control over the activities set forth in 10/3. Specifically paragraph 3a would seem to place complete control of covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities within the JCS. Similarly the last sentence in paragraph 3b reenforces JCS control. (In active military theatres)³

2. Paragraph 3d then produces [reduces?] the “coordinating” role of the Secretary of State vis-à-vis the Director of Central Intelligence in Washington. It has been suggested that this coordinating role is insufficiently explicit and does not extend down to the theatre commanders through the JCS.

It has been suggested to me that the Department should ask for a great deal more in that the roles between the Department and the Military Establishment have now reached a point where the Department of State is in a position to obtain a great deal more than this document provides for. It was therefore suggested that the two alterations marked on page 2 and page 3 of the draft 10/3 might now be included in the Department’s comment requested by Mr. Lay.

I have the following comments to make:

1. General Smith and Allen W. Dulles feel that it is necessary at this time to obtain for CIA what is set forth in 10/3. They both feel that they have gone as far as possible in asserting CIA’s role vis-à-vis the JCS in Washington and as related to theatre commanders. As long as the present JCS position remains in its present state, nothing further can be accomplished in increasing the responsibility and authority of the CIA particularly in military theatres. As you know, General Smith and Allen Dulles are presently in Tokyo in an endeavor to accomplish something with General MacArthur and General Willoughby which will make it possible for CIA to play some role in the intelligence field in General MacArthur’s theatre. (Has his theatre ever been defined geographically?)

2. The Director of Central Intelligence feels that if he tries to get more than 10/3 calls for, he might end up by getting much less. In other words, General Smith is prepared to settle for 10/3 as presently drafted on the theory that this gives him enough to work out CIA’s problems in the command structure given present thinking within the JCS and the personalities of theatre commanders in time of war. General Smith does not feel that it would be wise at this time, in his endeavor to obtain the necessary degree of authority and control over secret operations and clandestine activities, to engage in a jurisdictional battle with the JCS which would raise basic issues, generate heat and conflict and probably result in jeopardizing what CIA now has and can get in the present circumstances.

3. My own feeling is that the Department of State can probably not go beyond the present language of draft NSC 10/3 in asserting civilian responsibility and authority. General Magruder and Admiral Stevens agree that this is a fact. General Magruder is an outstanding exponent of the theory that war is too serious a business for the generals, is an extension of politics, etc., etc. He advises against the Department’s trying to assert itself further than is now outlined in the present draft and believes that if it did so the JCS would react violently, and immediate conflict would develop and there would be little or no hope of getting even what is set forth in the present language of 10/3.

I think it will be most useful if Messrs. Matthews and Webb could have your comments on the foregoing.⁴

Robert P. Joyce

Attachment⁵

DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

no

COVERT OPERATIONS AND CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that:

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for the planning, preparation and execution of covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities in peace or in war and for insuring that such operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with and in support of U.S. foreign and military policies and with overt activities.

3. The DCI shall coordinate with the Secretary of State in order to insure that plans and activities are consistent with the political strategy and political operations and objectives of the United States.

4. In areas other than theaters of military operations, the senior representative of the DCI shall keep the respective senior political representatives, in the countries concerned, generally advised of covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities affecting the area of their responsibility or based thereon, and shall obtain political guidance from such representatives with respect thereto.

5. The following relationships shall prevail in wartime or in peacetime in areas where U.S. military forces are engaged in combat:

a. The DCI shall coordinate covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate non-military U.S. Government departments and agencies, and insure that plans for such activities are accepted by JCS as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime or emergency military operations.

b. Covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities in a theater of military command shall come within the responsibility of the theater commander and the DCI shall designate a senior representative to be on the General Staff of each theater commander concerned with such operations and activities, responsible to the theater commander through the Chief of Staff, to assist in the planning, direction and command of such operations and activities. Policy direction and control of the execution of such operations and activities in the theater shall be through the JCS via the theater commander.

c. Theater commanders shall be advised of such covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities as are based in their respective areas but with objectives that transcend or do not directly affect the responsibilities of the respective theater commanders.

d. For reasons of security and adequate liaison, the DCI shall maintain independent communications with his representatives overseas, including lateral communications between theaters. Arrangements for such communications shall be coordinated with those of the military.

6. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide continuous guidance and support of the DCI in planning covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities and insure that such operations and activities receive the necessary and appropriate support.

7. As used herein clandestine intelligence includes espionage and counterespionage; covert operations include guerilla warfare (as defined in NSC_____), sabotage, covert demolitions, covert countersabotage, covert removal of personnel including escape and evasion evacuation and exfiltration, covert propaganda, covert political warfare and covert economic warfare. Such operations do not include armed conflict by organized military forces or cover and deception for military purposes.

8. The foregoing rescinds paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2 and all other provisions of NSC 10/2 and NSCID No. 5 which may be inconsistent with the provisions of this directive.

1. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files: NSC 10 Series, 1951. Top Secret.
2. Joyce apparently clipped this memorandum to a file folder holding several documents on this topic. The folder has not been found.
3. The parenthetical phrase was added by hand. References to paragraphs 3a and 3d under points 1 and 2 of this memorandum apparently refer to the earlier draft attached to Document 38.
4. A handwritten postscript by Joyce reads, “… Another consideration: If this Dept. causes difficulties with the JCS which hold up indefinitely W.B. Smith’s new charter, he and C.I.A., I think, will not appreciate this Dept’s role therein. RPJ.” Ellipsis in the original.
5. Top Secret.