Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

124. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, April 18, 1955—7:51 p.m.

3697. French Ambassador called 18th and discussed Indochina situation in one-hour conversation with Secretary.

Ambassador opened by giving his interpretation present differences in viewpoints between U.S. France. While French believe solution to crisis should be studied in Saigon by Ely and Collins and recommendations put forward jointly by them so two Governments could make common decision, U.S. viewpoint appears to be French are suggesting replacement of Diem and that the U.S. would like to know details of French proposal which U.S. would then consider. French believe U.S. viewpoint unfortunate, since programs and steps should be undertaken jointly. They do not wish it said French alone are suggesting change, since reaction to unilateral French proposal would be bad. Ambassador then referred to French Aide-Mémoire contained in Paris 4503² (U.S. and French versions appeared to be same).

Secretary stated we agree there is crisis in Vietnam. We believe crisis has developed because of inability of Diem to take necessary action against Binh Xuyen when they challenged Government. French seem to feel crisis has arisen because of Diem’s general inadequacies. U.S. does not think it wise to make any change without being absolutely certain that alternate would be preferable. U.S. not wedded to Diem. He was not picked by U.S. Secretary questioned whether French had in fact fully backed Diem. Without questioning Ely’s good will or French Government’s instructions, could not help having feeling lack of full support. The French Press continually refers to Diem as being “U.S. supported”. Presumably if he fell, French skirts would be clean and the loss of prestige would be U.S. Since it is French who have proposed change, it is up to them to tell us what they have in mind.

Referring to Aide-Mémoire Secretary said could agree in principle to most of points made. However we are not faced with issue of principles but one of realities. Basic choice appears to be either abrupt change, having appearance of French scheme, or slower evolutionary change arising out of action by Vietnamese people. U.S. prefers latter. Among several reasons for this preference, Congressional reaction looms large. Secretary referred to upcoming Congressional examination 56 budget. If Diem yanked out of office and replaced by French or French-U.S. formula, legalized by Bao Dai, Secretary does not believe any chance of getting Congress to appropriate either money for support of Vietnam or for French Expeditionary Corps. Congress would wish to cut losses and utilize credits in other places where appears better chance success.

Secretary said Collins was asked to return soon principally to appear before Congressional Committees and to discuss Vietnamese problem.

Returning to formula put forward French Aide-Mémoire, Secretary pointed out Binh Xuyen enjoy police powers result Bao Dai action. Can we assume Bao Dai will withdraw these powers from which he apparently draws revenue? In past Bao Dai has not indicated he puts national welfare above personal advantages. Another factor regarding removal of Diem is possibility he would not submit to abrupt removal by French or U.S. but would simply become another divisive factor working against any successor Government and be endowed with considerable local support. Only short time ago in Saigon Secretary was informed Diem enjoyed considerable popular support and that it was doubtful if he could be removed without highly unfavorable repercussions.

Ambassador replied it true Ely prevented Diem from trying to wipe out Binh Xuyen. Ely did not do this because he supported Binh Xuyen but because, first, of doubt national army could do job successfully, and, second, if it did, Binh Xuyen would be driven underground to continue opposition. During December talks in Paris, French had expressed misgivings of Diem but had no alternative solution. In interim, French had done best to support Diem but even with such support, he is incapable. Ambassador said French felt insufficient time remained for working toward solution through elections in South Viet–Nam to provide basis for Government. Therefore something must be done by U.S. and French to find alternate solution at once.

Secretary reiterated U.S. position that of choosing one of two apparent alternate courses of action, specifically whether to proceed along the lines proposed by French, remove Diem at once and replace him with yet unknown person. This course was inferior from our viewpoint to more gradual and evolutionary change in the Government arising out of expression of desires of Vietnamese people. Also fact could not be escaped that, in the Secretary’s view, Congress would not appropriate funds if the course proposed by French were followed.

Ambassador remarked French felt necessary turn to Bao Dai to effect change in Government because there is no electoral body in Viet–Nam. The Secretary asked why an electoral body could not be set up. The spectacle of the French with or without U.S. participating suddenly yanking Diem out of office and going through the motions of having him replaced by Bao Dai at Cannes would be unedifying.³

Ambassador asked our reaction if he should recommend to his Government that it send representative to Washington to be here for discussions during Collins’ visit. Secretary agreed good idea but we still unsure of Collins’ schedule.

Ambassador summarized by saying we have to solve problems of

a. Is it necessary to make a change?

b. If it is, to whom would we turn?

Secretary agreed and said in any change Diem’s strength should be retained as an asset for the Government of Viet–Nam and not a force against it. Also there is the question of dealing with the sects. We consider Cao Dai and Hoa Hao as apart from Binh Xuyen. Former have some roots in Vietnamese community and probably should not be drastically uprooted. Binh Xuyen have no such stature. Ambassador said he felt the sects should work with Government but should not run it.

Secretary agreed and stated their armies would probably have to be integrated to some degree in national army.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1755. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent priority to Saigon; drafted by Hoey; cleared by Young, Merchant, MacArthur, and Robertson; and signed by Dulles.
2. Document 122.
3. Dulles changed the last word in this sentence from “catastrophic” to “unedifying”.