Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

125. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 19, 1955—11 p.m.

4661. For Secretary from Collins.

1. I met with Ely at 0900 April 19. Ely gave general historical review of his position, stressing point that he had always supported Diem, even before my arrival. He repeated earlier remarks to effect that charges his subordinates had worked against his orders and on behalf of sects were false. He said “legend” French had withheld gasoline supplies from Vietnamese Army was no more than propaganda and evidence bad faith. Diem is now engaging in propaganda war on Ely, charging him with being a “colonialist”, whereas, in fact, he hates the thing as much as the word. He said he had done everything possible help Diem until latter had incurred risk of civil war, feeling that Prime Minister should be supported, since Diem had done much after Geneva maintain integrity of Free Vietnam, and thanks to him, refugees coming south had been so numerous. Ely added that since he had defended Diem so stoutly, he thought himself able now express his full revised opinion which is that Diem cannot be saved if we wish to save Vietnam. Diem has played his part, but to keep him now would be to risk catastrophe.

2. Ely continued that our common problem is now to save Vietnam from Communism. Even Diem’s own men feel he is incapable of governing. Army does not support him, except to extent that he breaks down army organization and discipline to attract individuals to his cause. Intellectuals are against him, and Ely feels county is on verge of chaos. The few men who are still working with Diem are inspired by him with feeling of hatred toward all forms of opposition. Sects are unanimously against Diem even Trinh Minh The. Diem cannot now solve sect problem regardless of offers he might make to sects. Ely added he feels crisis has reached such degree there is no longer any possibility of saving Diem and that to preserve him artificially only prolongs crisis.

3. He added Diem cannot work with a new team and that Binh Xuyen will not surrender police control to him. With respect to modified Thoai proposal, Ely said I had stated it would work only if three essential conditions were realized. These conditions cannot be realized except through great pressure exerted by France and U.S., and such pressure would nullify any good qualities inherent in proposal.² Ely said conversation he held with Quat April 17 led him believe Quat was unwilling compromise himself by working with Diem now. Ely said that to maintain Diem as head of government would require such pressure from France and U.S. that he would inevitably be stigmatized as most thorough-going puppet yet to govern Vietnam. Moreover, modified Thoai plan would tend to eliminate Bao Dai who is only existing legal power.

4. I said proposal as it now stands is that Provisional Assembly would “recommend” chief of government to Bao Dai. To be sure, we would have to bring pressure on Bao Dai to make him accept recommendation but that would not compromise such legality as he possesses. Ely said many people do not see problem in that light, and any effort to eliminate Bao Dai prematurely before stable political institutions would be to court anarchy. I agreed with Ely that for time being status of Bao Dai must be maintained, but felt proposal to have Provisional Assembly nominate Prime Minister, Diem or someone else, would retain legal status of Bao Dai.

5. I told Ely that Do had said selection by Bao Dai of new Prime Minister would cause Diem’s successor to lose one-half his prestige at once. Ely said that Do may actually now have turned in his thinking to Bao Dai. He said he believed worst possible solution would be to consolidate Diem’s position through intermediary of Bao Dai. He said no elections can be held until tensions are relaxed and that Diem is incapable of exerting pacifying influence. Moreover, he said there is evidence Diem is trying buy off sects, including Bay Vien, with U.S. money. He commented this was curiously venal practice for “pure” man. Ely said he believes our first task is to solve present crisis and that cannot be done by means of modified Thoai proposal which would not save Diem but, on contrary, might lose Vietnam.

6. Ely repeated his belief that past support for Diem had not been an error. He said that we must now envisage changing Prime Minister but not policy. This, he said, corresponds to wishes of Vietnamese people. I asked Ely how he could prove such is will of Vietnamese people in absence of any Assembly. Statement can only represent Ely’s estimate. He replied it is obvious that people wish to be rid of Diem. I replied Diem could challenge statement and, in any case, no one was in position to prove Vietnamese people wished to be rid of Diem. Ely said present crisis itself was evidence. I replied that crisis had been caused by sect minority looking after own selfish interests. Same governmental program under another Prime Minister would inevitably have led to opposition from sects. Ely said that if such other Prime Minister had been similar to Diem he would agree, but Diem had handled situation very badly, and even his own relatives, Do and Thoai, no longer believed in him.

7. I told Ely he and I were foreigners here and even Bao Dai was to some extent foreign. None of us could say whether Vietnamese people were united as to choice of any successor to Diem. Without Parliament, it cannot be proved to U.S. public and press opinion that Diem is no longer wanted. If Diem was removed in absence of some representative body, I could not predict U.S. Congressional reaction. Therefore, I urged Ely not discount solution unless Vietnamese themselves rejected it. Ely repeated that Diem remains in power only by our intervention. I said if his analysis was correct, an Assembly would vote Diem out, and if an Assembly did so, I believed U.S. would accept decision. Ely said he knew he could not prove his statement, but he believed that to maintain Diem against popular will would be to diminish validity of expression of popular will when elections become possible. I said that, on contrary, modified Thoai proposal would work only if acccepted by considerable body of Vietnamese opinion.³ Bao Dai is Franco-U.S. choice. I said I did not know whether proposal would work, that I intended to have further consultations today and only asked Ely not to prejudge outcome. Ely said that, in his view, no solution could appear to be more marked as Franco-U.S. solution than maintenance of Diem. I said I could not agree with this since plan would not work unless good many Vietnamese agreed to it.

8. Ely said that he must mark this as a point of disagreement between us since if plan did work it would be because of my putting pressure on Vietnamese. I agreed that Thoai proposal, as modified, would work only if U.S. and France backed it, and if the basic elements were agreed to by Diem, Do, Quat et al. and by Binh Xuyen. I reminded him Washington had not yet agreed to withdraw support from Diem, and that if it did agree to withdraw support, such withdrawal would be very hard for Secretary and me to explain to American people. Ely said he was unable to see how anyone was justified in maintaining Diem in office against best judgment of people on the spot. With respect to possible working out of proposal, I told Ely my guess would be that Provisional Assembly would vote Diem out of office unless he had been brought to change his methods of operation. Ely said this was a difference of point of view between us, explained by fact that he has special responsibilities with respect to crisis which he feels cannot be solved as long Diem is in office. He said situation is getting worse daily, and he attributes this wholly to Diem’s influence. Situation is worsening in the center, and underground is growing. Only by surgery, that is removal of Diem, can country be saved. I said I did not believe situation would develop radically in three weeks, but I would present Ely’s views to Washington. Ely said he did not believe situation could be solved in three weeks but could become irremediable in that time. He said that country must have psychological shock of change of Prime Minister.

9. Ely went on to say that, paradoxical as it might seem, south had never had such good chance of being saved. He rates this chance now at more than 50 percent. He said Viet Minh are losing their own economic battle. They have lost struggle for refugees, and they have not succeeded in consolidating their administrative apparatus. In south, people have not been too badly contaminated by Viet Minh and can still be taken in hand by someone other than Diem.

10. I told Ely we had received copy of French answers on Washington questions. I said one thing was missing; namely, who French have in mind as new Prime Minister and Cabinet members. Ely said he would be tempted to give me names and that he was sure my list was similar to his. However, neither he nor French Government wants French solution. He was certain that if he gave me specific names, solution would at some point be made to appear French. I said Washington would still want this question answered.

11. I reiterated to Ely I have publicly and privately reported support he has given Diem. At same time, there is conviction in Washington that French Government has not given Diem full support but has been only waiting for an opportunity to get rid of him. That and fact France has simultaneously been carrying on negotiations with Viet Minh in Hanoi is why Washington is skeptical about French position. Ely said that if he had not received instructions to effect that French colonialism was dead in Vietnam, that French Union was based on idea of equality, and that despite Sainteny’s presence only Ely spoke for France in Vietnam, he would not be here now. He said that he and he alone is responsible for execution of French policy in Vietnam. I suggested that Paris might usefully say to Washington what Ely had just said to me. Van Laetham said that what happened in north had no connection with our problem here. I said that, on contrary, in Washington view there is intimate connection. Van Laetham said French understand our problem with respect to public opinion, but they have their own public opinion problem, and French Government had to attempt topreserve something in north. That did not mean, however, that government was playing double game. I again suggested that should be made clear to Washington.

12. Ely said that if Diem must be retained as Prime Minister, he felt he could not continue to be responsible French representative in Vietnam.

13. To summarize Ely’s position, I said with respect to modified Thoai proposal he made three major points:

(a) Ely said he thought it would not work and would be interpreted as a solution imposed from without.

(b) Ely does not believe situation could be held in balance for six weeks.

(c) It appeared Ely felt that if conditions prerequisite to implementing modified Thoai proposal were met, he would still feel he could not remain here or continue to accept responsibility during next six weeks. I had understood Ely to say he could not remain if Diem remained permanently in power. I wished to know whether that stricture applied also to provisional solution.

14. Ely said he did not believe in solution, that he did not think it valid, that he felt that new crisis would be upon us in three weeks, and that we would lose our last chance to save Vietnam. I said it appeared clear Ely would not accept solution. In that case, it could obviously not work, especially since there could be no question of replacing Ely at this point.

15. I suggested that I report later April 19 my consultations with Do, Quat, et al., and with Diem. I said to Ely I did not know what would be outcome of my trip to Washington. I believed that if Vietnamese agreed to modified Thoai proposal, U.S. would support it if French would. In any case, I thought it worth trying. I said that in any case I believed that with U.S.–French support and cooperation there would not be outbreak of civil war during my absence. I said I was very concerned that if French Government has decided that Diem must leave at once, without any transitional phase, decision might be to end U.S. aid. I said Ely might think such a decision would be grave mistake, but it might still be taken by Congress through cutting off appropriations.

16. More follows.⁴

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1955. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information priority to Paris for Dillon. Portions of this telegram are also printed in United States–Vietnam Relations, Book 10, pp. 912–914.

2. According to telegram 4544 from Saigon, April 14, Thoai proposed (and stated that the proposal had Diem’s agreement in principle) that an interim government be formed to carry on for 3 months by which time an elected constituent assembly would be in operation (elections were scheduled for May 15, 1955). This assembly would determine whether Diem or a successor should be premier and what form of government Vietnam should have. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1555)

   Collins suggested as a modification, reported in telegram 4599 from Saigon, April 17, that the assembly should recommend to Bao Dai whether to retain Diem or appoint a new premier. Collins’ three essential points were as follows: 1) the interim government should be made up of able men such as Quat, Do, Minh, and Thoai; 2) Diem should agree to allow these cabinet ministers to operate under true principles of cabinet responsibility and should agree to the decision of the provisional assembly as to his fate; and 3) the new interim government should take control of the National Police and Sûreté and appoint its own police chief. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–1755)

3. A note on the source text indicates that approximately 25 characters were omitted at this point in the coded message.
4. Telegram 4662, infra.