175. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 21, 19551
SUBJECT
- Outer Mongolia and the UN Membership Problem
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
- Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Director of Chinese Affairs
- Miss Ruth Bacon, UN Adviser, FE
Dr. Tan called at Mr. Robertson’s request in the absence from Washington of Ambassador Koo. Mr. Robertson referred to the Ambassador’s call on November 172 during which the Ambassador had stated the Chinese Government’s decision to veto Outer Mongolia’s application for UN membership and had requested US support in this position. Mr. Robertson said that we had also received a report of the Chinese Government’s position from Ambassador Rankin.
Mr. Robertson said that he had discussed the Chinese Government’s request with the Secretary who had asked that his views be conveyed at once to the Chinese Ambassador. Mr. Robertson reviewed the reasons which had led the Secretary to decide upon the membership position announced by Ambassador Lodge on November 13. Mr. Robertson followed the general lines of Ambassador Lodge’s press statement of that date but also emphasized the mounting pressures among UN members to find a solution of the membership impasse; referred specifically to the Secretary’s talks in Italy and Spain which had impressed the Secretary with the strength of feeling on the part of these countries over the membership issue; mentioned the restiveness on the part of other qualified candidates against their long continued exclusion from the UN; and pointed out that although this impasse resulted from Soviet vetoes, feeling was also coming to be directed against the US and other permanent members for their failure to find a solution.
Mr. Robertson said that negotiations on the membership question were in progress in New York, that we were doing what we could to prevent Outer Mongolia’s inclusion, but that so far the USSR was insistent on its inclusion. While it was possible that the USSR might not stand in the way of the admission of other applicants if Outer Mongolia were not assured admission or that the necessary votes might not be forthcoming for Outer Mongolia, we [Page 387] had to face the probability that the USSR would remain adamant and that in these circumstances the desire of UN members for the admission of qualified candidates might be so great that the needed votes would be provided for Outer Mongolia. He referred to reports from Ambassador Lodge that the Latin American states would almost certainly favor Outer Mongolia rather than permit the membership arrangements to fail over that issue and that the overwhelming majority of UN members apparently shared this view. He referred to the Vandenberg Resolution and said that the US would not use its veto to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia against the will of the overwhelming majority of UN members.
Mr. Robertson continued that if in these circumstances China were to veto the Outer Mongolian application the resentment of UN members against China would be so strong that it was to be anticipated that the question of Chinese representation would be reopened, perhaps at once. While we had been successful in maintaining the position on Chinese representation under the moratorium at the beginning of the current General Assembly, he believed that the Chinese Government could foresee what reaction might result if China’s vote had been decisive in blocking the admission of qualified members desired by the great majority of the United Nations. He said he did not believe that he needed to stress the seriousness of this situation. He mentioned that in 1946 China itself had felt constrained to vote for Outer Mongolia just as at a later date the US had felt constrained to abstain on one occasion on Outer Mongolia.
Mr. Robertson concluded by saying that the Secretary felt that he had no alternative but to urge strongly his hope that the Chinese Government would see its way clear to instruct the Chinese Delegation not to use its veto to obstruct a solution of the membership problem.
Minister Tan said that the Chinese Government felt strongly that it must veto the Outer Mongolian application. He sketched briefly the history of Outer Mongolia’s creation mentioning the Yalta Agreement and the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty and subsequent Communist aggression against the National Government. He said that President Chiang held strong views on this question as well as George Yeh and the Legislative Yuan. He said that he would at once inform Ambassador Koo in New York of the US position and would also inform Taipei without awaiting the Ambassador’s return.
Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Lodge had already talked with Mr. Tsiang in New York who had informed Ambassador Lodge of the Chinese Government’s determination to use the veto if necessary to prevent Outer Mongolia’s admission. In view of the seriousness with which we viewed the problem, Mr. Robertson said that the Secretary also intended to send a personal message to President Chiang.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2155. Secret. Drafted by Bacon.↩
- See Document 168.↩