178. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1

485. President Chiang asked me to see him tonight re Outer Mongolia. Foreign Minister acted as interpreter.

Message from Chinese Embassy in Washington leads Chiang to believe US has changed policy re Outer Mongolia. He understood we firmly opposed its admission to UNO; now we were asking GRC [Page 391] to abstain in case of vote which probably would result in Outer Mongolia entering UNO. GRC also dislikes idea of European satellites gaining admission but would go along with US in abstaining to that extent. In case of Outer Mongolia however GRC would use every legal means to prevent entry including veto if necessary.

Admission of Outer Mongolia would be widely regarded as significant step toward entry of Red China into UNO, President believes. Moreover, it has none of attributes of sovereignty. Defense and foreign affairs are in Soviet hands; no country of free world has diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia. Of all Soviet satellites it is most complete puppet. GRC could not sit at table with its representatives and could not justify before own people anything less than strongest opposition to Outer Mongolia’s entry into UNO.

President indicated surprise at mention of GRC’s Y 1945–1946 attitude towards independence and UNO membership for Outer Mongolia.

GRC had taken steps most reluctantly at that time because compelled to do so following Yalta. Subsequent actions by Soviets had removed any obligation to continue along same line and GRC had abrogated Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1953.

Chiang proposed to issue statement on subject and asked my opinion on this and on subject in general. I said clear statement might be useful once GRC definitely decided but that timing important and statement should not be premature. As to US policy I knew of no change as regards Outer Mongolia but supposed we were in embarrassing position because of our desire see such countries as Japan, Spain and Italy gain admission.

President asked me transmit his views urgently.

In recent conversation Japanese Ambassador told me he understood GRC position that detaching Outer Mongolia was first step in dismemberment of China.2

Rankin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2255. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Hong Kong and Tokyo.
  2. The Department’s response, telegram 308 to Taipei, November 22, drafted by Dulles and Robertson, reads as follows: “Your 485 just received. Regret Deptels 304 and 305 [Document 176 and supra] did not reach you prior to this meeting. It is imperative that President Chiang realize gravity this situation and there was nothing perfunctory about President’s and my messages to him. The President spent about an hour at Camp David this morning before Cabinet meeting working on his message with me. He dictated most of it himself, personally marked it up and then signed personally the penciled draft now embodied in the cable. Also there were drawn into the discussion Under Secretary Hoover and Ambassador Lodge.” (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2255)