Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, August 4, 1958—5 p.m.

372. Re Deptel 397² and Embtel 272.³ I have held off informing King Hussein/Prime Minister Rifai contents reference telegram since no reference made his second proposal calling for US/HKJ mutual defense treaty, establishment MAAG/Jordan which I am certain he will inquire about. If it is Department’s intention hold in abeyance decision this matter pending outcome Security Council meeting Middle East as in case creation two new brigades I am concerned over depressing effect it likely have on Hussein at time he already feels USG has not been as responsive as he had hoped Jordan security needs.

Increasing talk among both Jordanian/foreign communities to effect Hussein position becoming untenable for long pull, might be better if he left scene quietly after making arrangement transfer power provisional junta rather than hazard widespread civil strife brought on by frustration people at Jordan’s economic/political encirclement by hostile states abetted by Nasser agents infiltrated from Syria.

I am convinced that unless it is our intention build Jordan into Middle East freedom fortress capable acting as base operations, designed undermine, bring down pro-Nasser governments adjacent states to be followed by creation free Arab federation it would be better permit Jordan make adjustment political/economic realities its present future position.

Country team opinion it is still not too late perform holding operation Jordan providing USG willing commit necessary money, equipment, technical know-how do job. Any such undertaking will be costly running possibly as high as $100 million annually, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. To justify expenditure incidental fortress concept Jordan’s potential as advanced base, wide-range paramilitary operations must be fully utilized; otherwise it will serve no useful purpose achievement US national objectives.⁴

Wright

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5/8–458. Top Secret; Niact.
2. Supra.
3. Document 233.
4. The Department responded on August 5, in telegram 423 to Amman, that the considerations which led to a determination to defer a decision on the two additional brigades until after the pending Security Council meeting on the Middle East also applied to the decision on the U.S.–Jordan mutual defense treaty and the establishment of a MAAG for Jordan. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.5/8–458; included in the microfiche supplement)