Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

278. Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 18, 1958—7 p.m.

Delga 651. Re Emergency GA.

1. Secretary met privately this morning with Dels of Norway,² Denmark, Sweden, UK, Ceylon, Liberia, Colombia and Ghana to discuss Norwegian draft res.³

2. In response request for comments by Engen (Norway) who chaired meeting Secretary explained US position along following lines (cleared by Secretary):

Secretary said joint resolution was carefully thought out and well rounded resolution which US would support. If anything, some people might say US had gone too far in its willingness to accept moderate language on withdrawal. There was danger focus of GA might be shifted from complaints against interference in Jordan and Lebanon by UAR and from constructive action it might take to help bring stability to Middle East, into focus on Soviet demand for US and British withdrawal. This danger had to be carefully guarded against.

Secretary said US troops had been sent to Lebanon with great reluctance. It was case where decision to do so was not satisfactory, but decision not to have done so would have been worse. US had known for six weeks that Government of Lebanon might feel it necessary to request assistance. We had sought to dissuade Lebanese Government from doing so. When revolt occurred, Lebanese Government formally requested US assistance without prior consultation with US. In circumstances, we responded immediately. US troops went to assist in maintaining independence and integrity of Lebanon against civil strife fomented from without, and to assist in protecting American lives and property and for no other reasons. They would stay no longer than necessary. Two main concerns expressed about US action had already been dispelled. First of these was that US troops had been sent in to support President Chamoun for new term as President of Lebanon; this had been dispelled by election of General Chehab. Second was that US troops might attack Iraq. This was never any part of our intention and any suspicion that it may have been so was dispelled by our recognition of Iraq.

Problem now facing US is whether UN can take up task and make it possible for US forces to withdraw. Draft res will not work, and no draft res will, unless it has acquiescence of UAR. It was not vital whether UAR voted for res, or acquiesced by abstaining. Its real attitude was what was important. There could not be enough UN soldiers in Lebanon or Jordan to protect countries against determined efforts by UAR to penetrate. Many other things—its radio broadcasts and supplies of money—would be difficult to prevent. Willingness of UAR to keep its hands off was required.

Lebanon and Jordan were different from other countries in Middle East and raised key problems of concern. Lebanon was roughly half Christian and half Moslem. Jordan occupied key political position in respect to general armistice agreements with Israel, raising serious questions with respect to general Middle Eastern stability. Neither country had any oil. It was apparent that neither of them had assets of such value that anyone should risk peace of world to get them.

If SYG could obtain acquiescence of UAR to keep its hands off Lebanon and set up semi-permanent representation of UN in Lebanon, it should be possible for US to get its forces out very quickly. US wanted to do this very much provided it did so under honorable conditions and with full respect to right of one nation to help another nation that is imperiled. It is difficult to pin down this problem much closer. Given acquiescence by UAR in program set out in res, and especially paragraph A,⁴ we believe US troops can get out very soon. It is desirable they should stay until after change of government on September 23 or 24. General Chehab has already told us he is anxious that they stay until then. Chehab, of course, was UAR candidate for President of Lebanon number of weeks ago. In fact, UAR had suggested US and UAR jointly sponsor him. We rejected this because we did not think it was up to either UAR or US to pick pres of Lebanon. Now he has been chosen by Lebanese themselves. In light previous UAR position it now ought to be possible, therefore, to work out practical arrangements for an early withdrawal.

It is not possible to pick definite calendar date. However, we would be disappointed if there were not acquiescence by UAR and action by SYG so that he could report by September 30 that question was well on way toward being resolved. In earlier conversations with FonMin Fawzi we had gotten impression UAR would be prepared to go along with program such as res presented. If this is still UAR attitude, question can be resolved quickly.

Secretary also pointed out declaration US was submitting to SYG regarding its position on withdrawal included statement we would abide by decision of UNGA.⁵ This was remarkable position beyond that ever made by any other government in similar circumstances. If there was anyone who still compared US position in Lebanon to that of USSR in Hungary, it might be suggested that USSR make same type of statement with respect to its forces in Hungary.

3. Lloyd (UK) stated UK position was much same as that of US. UK reluctance to go into Jordan was much same as that of US re Lebanon. This could be easily understood when hazardous nature of supply lines was considered. On practical grounds UK was extremely anxious for other arrangements to be made under res. It was not question of UN force in Jordan or of large number of people. For UAR to hold off was most important. If UAR willing to reach “détente” all that would be needed was UN “presence”. UN commissioner in Amman might be enough. Sooner he was there sooner UK would be ready to leave Jordan. It would not serve world peace or UN if UK left in circumstances of dishonor.

UK was anxious to solve problem. UK action deserved more commendation than received. If UN was ready to take responsibility UK was ready to go provided it was done in position of honor and satisfactory substitute was put in its place.

He hoped very much action in Lebanon and Jordan could move on parallel basis. September 23rd has been mentioned, and it had certain standing with respect to Lebanon. He hoped that by that date SYG would have succeeded and could report on “détente” achieved. He could not be more precise than that.

4. Smith (Canada) asked if UK position on UN role in Jordan was restrictive or if Lloyd would think at least of commissioner and staff of observers. Lloyd replied this could be left to SYG. UN force was hardly practical or suitable, although SYG and “we to some extent” once favored it. He was “chary” of observers but thought there might be more than one man and immediate staff. Smith replied Canada would be satisfied that it would be for SYG to decide. He interpreted UK statement as not being restrictive or exclusive.

5. Corea (Ceylon) said he could not express his del’s position yet. Did UAR acquiesce? There was one problem in US–UK letters. That was statement referring to withdrawal when “no longer required”. He thought there was interest in having withdrawal when or “as soon as” UN action was taken.

6. Other dels did not speak.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–1858. Confidential; Priority.
2. A handwritten note on the telegram at this point, in an unknown hand, reads “Canada (?)”. A chronology of the Secretary’s meetings on August 18, prepared by the Delegation, indicates that Canada, as one of the cosponsors of the resolution, was represented at the meeting by the Canadian Foreign Secretary. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1097)
3. The meeting took place in a conference room of the General Assembly building at 10:15 a.m. The “Norwegian” resolution, cited in footnote 3, Document 271, was introduced in the General Assembly on August 18 by Norway, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Liberia, Panama, and Paraguay.

4. Paragraph A of the draft resolution reads:

   • “1. Reaffirms that all Member States should ‘refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people of any State’;
   • “2. Calls upon all Member States strictly to observe these obligations and to ensure that their conduct, by word and deed, in relation to the general area of the Near East, conforms to the above-mentioned policy.”

5. In an August 18 letter to the President of the General Assembly, Dulles stated: “United States forces will be withdrawn from Lebanon whenever requested by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon, or whenever, as a result of the further action of the United Nations or otherwise, their presence is no longer required.” He added: “The United States will in any event abide by a determination of the United Nations General Assembly that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continued presence of United States forces in Lebanon unnecessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.” (U.N. doc. A/3876, printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, p. 1042)