Office of the Historian

35. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, August 3, 1958, 3 p.m.1

Washington, August 3, 1958, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Israeli Decision to Request U.S. to Cease Overflights of Israel

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
  • Mr. Yaacov Herzog, Israeli Minister
  • The Secretary
  • C—Mr. Reinhardt
  • NEA—Mr. Rountree
  • NE—Mr. Rockwell

Ambassador Eban and Mr. Herzog called at the Secretary’s request. The Secretary spoke strongly to them of the President’s and his shock upon learning that as soon as Israel received a Soviet protest concerning the US and UK overflights of Israel to Jordan, Israel was preparing to acquiesce to the Soviet request that the flights be stopped. The Secretary said that it was particularly shocking that Israel would do this without any consultation with the US. We had believed that Israel fully agreed with the US and UK purpose in Lebanon and Jordan of showing the Soviets and Nasser there was a point beyond which they could not go. If Israel had now changed its mind, we would like to know. There were wide political implications in giving the USSR a sense of power in the Middle East by such subservient actions as Israel seemed prepared to take.

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Ambassador Eban said that Israel was deeply concerned over the malevolent power of the Soviet Union which could destroy Israel in five minutes. The Prime Minister’s decision was based on the belief that the additional British request for overflight permission involved the sending of additional troops into Jordan which were an added convenience but not crucial for the support of the British operation. Israel felt that by now the British should have been able to make other arrangements to get these forces into Jordan. Israel lacked a formal security guarantee from the US and felt itself in a most poignant position.

The Secretary stated that the Eisenhower Doctrine made clear that the US would come to the support of Israel should it be attacked by a Communist power. For future guidance we wanted to know whether Israel felt so menaced by the USSR that it would do whatever the Soviet Union requested.

The Ambassador said he would at once transmit the Secretary’s important observations to his government. Israeli general fortitude could not be questioned, he thought. The Secretary said he was sorry he had had to speak so bluntly, but important issues were at stake.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5411/8–358. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell and initialed by Rountree. At a 10 a.m. meeting with the British Minister, it was decided that Dulles would ask Eban to call and would “strongly protest” the Israeli decision. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)↩