36. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington,
August 5, 19581
Washington, August 5, 1958
SUBJECT
- Use of Israel Airspace for Airlift to Jordan
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of
Israel
- Mr. Ya’acov Herzog,
Minister, Embassy of Israel
- Mr. Shimon Peres, Director General, Israel
Ministry of Defense
- The Acting Secretary
- NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
- NE—William L. Hamilton
Ambassador Eban handed the Acting
Secretary a letter from Prime Minister Ben
Gurion to the Secretary, a copy of which is attached,
expressing the latter’s consent to U.S. resumption of its airlift to
Jordan through Israel and denying there was any relationship between
[Page 84]
his request to Ambassador
Lawson that the airlift be
terminated and the Soviet note of August 1 charging that Israel’s
assistance to the airlift was aggressive.
Ambassador Eban said it was
impossible to exaggerate the distress the Prime Minister would feel if
any doubt remained in the President’s or the Secretary’s mind about
Israel’s determination to resist Communism. There was room for
divergence of opinion and judgment on questions of mutual concern but
Israel would like to think that one thing was regarded as axiomatic—that
there can be no question of Israel’s principles in regard to Communism
and tyranny and democracy and human freedom. To the Government of
Israel, the most urgent aspect of the problem arising from the airlift
was the elimination of U.S. doubts about Israel’s steadfastness. Mr.
Eban asked that this sense of
urgency be conveyed to the Secretary and the President as soon as
possible.
On the practical problem itself and contrary to the general public
impression, Israel’s doubts about the airlift were not created by the
Soviet note which Israel had no intention of answering in haste.
Governor Herter asked if he was
correct in assuming that the Israelis were holding up their reply to the
Soviets to be able to give them a definitive answer on the circumstances
of the airlift and Israel’s termination of its consent to use of its
airspace.
Mr. Eban repeated that his
Government was in no hurry to respond to the note which, when prepared,
would reject the suggestion that there was anything connecting
international illegitimacy either about the airlift itself or Israel
cooperation. “It’s a queer aggression,” Mr. Eban said, “if only one in eleven nations so defines
it.” Mr. Herzog remarked that the
Cabinet would not be meeting on the issue until next Sunday, August 10,
and the reply certainly would not be made before then. There was no
reason to suppose that it would be made with any haste thereafter.
Mr. Eban remarked that when
originally approached about the overflights, they had stressed the
desirability of the more rational route via Aqaba. He proposed that U.S.
representatives in Tel Aviv get in touch immediately with Colonel
Harkabi of the Israel Defense Force, whom he
described as the liaison officer on the airlift, to begin discussions on
the technical level for the purpose of terminating the airlift as soon
as possible consistent with U.S. requirements.
Governor Herter concurred and
introduced the question of how to move quickly to dispel the impression
in the public mind, which was extremely unfortunate to Western interests
in the Middle East, that the Israel action was responsive to Soviet
demands. A discussion of how best to modify the impression ensued. Mr.
Eban volunteered to tell the
press that contact between the U.S. and Israel, which had been
established with the inception of the airlift, was continuing without
interruption
[Page 85]
and, contrary to
reports in the press, the flights were going on.2
Attachment
Tel
Aviv, August 5,
1958.
Letter From Prime Minister Ben Gurion to Secretary of
State Dulles3
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am distressed and
surprised by a misunderstanding which has arisen in your mind of
what I conveyed to Ambassador Lawson and Sir Francis Randall
on August 2.
In these conversations I was not dealing with our basic approach to
global issues [11/2 lines of source text not
declassified]. For many centuries our people has
demonstrated, no less than any other nation, its capacity of
resistance to the threats of powerful forces. For forty years,
millions of our brethren in the Soviet Union itself have stood up to
fearful pressures without abandoning their Jewish consciousness and
their spiritual heritage. I was therefore shocked to hear that you
found it possible to say to our Ambassador that Israel had “caved
in” immediately to a Soviet threat, and that a Soviet letter can
bring us to submission. I cannot imagine, Mr. Secretary, how it
could occur to you that we are capable of “subservience to Soviet
Threats”. We do not have the physical strength which certain great
nations possess. But I venture to say that we do not fall short of
any nation in the world in moral courage. Were this not the case, no
trace of us would have been left a long time ago.
I even believe that Israel in her ten years of existence has incurred
more risks, defied more threats, displayed greater resolution in
grave hours than most other nations in the world, including many
less vulnerable and exposed than us. Although we have no doubt of
the sincere interest of the United States in the independence and
integrity of Israel, as expressed by the President in his last
letter to me, we have never been granted a guarantee of our
integrity. Moreover, we have not heard that the Soviet Union has
ever been told concerning Israel what it has been told about the
consequences of an attack on Turkey; nor have we ever been told that
clear and explicit words about the United States interest in our
integrity and independence have been said to Nasser and other Arab rulers who
openly declare the policy of
[Page 86]
destroying Israel. We are surrounded by foes who receive abundant
arms from the Soviet Union, and who receive Western arms as well,
and yet we are not intimidated. I must however admit that we are
concerned because up to now we have not been successful in receiving
arms assistance from the United States.
As you personally are aware, we have incurred great risks for
ourselves and our brethren in relation to the Soviet Union in days
before the Middle East resolution of the United States Congress4 was adopted, as well as since that
time. In the days immediately following the American and British
actions in Lebanon and Jordan, at a time when the air was full of
tension and the possibility of world conflict, I did not object to
flights over Israel territory in connection with the American air
demonstration over Jordan; to an airlift of British troops to
Jordan; to an American oil airlift; and to a continuation of British
and American supplies to British troops in Jordan for a number of
days.
On the other hand, from July 16 onwards I have constantly urged the
advisability of finding an alternative route. The use of Israel’s
territory has involved us in serious embarrassments and dangers. To
this day I cannot understand why three weeks after the first landing
the alternative route has not been brought into full use.
It is my best judgment that we should try to prevent the tensions
created for us and others by this over-flight procedure, and should
concentrate all energies on developing the other route. I believe
that it was legitimate for me to have this judgment on the
over-flight question without my basic stand on the great world
issues being called into question.
I admit that the Soviet Note caused us concern. The vast disparity
between Soviet strength and Israel strength makes this concern
worthy of understanding. But you know of our contributions to the
efforts of free people to stem the tide of communism will, on
reflection, not believe that a threat, even from so powerful a
source, would deter us from doing something vital to the cause of
human freedom, which is Israel’s cause.
In making decisions involving risk at critical times I have never had
the feeling that Israel’s security is as firmly guaranteed as is
that of other nations within the free world. I take note of the
categorical and emphatic way in which you have informed me, through
Ambassador Eban, that if a
Soviet attack took place against Israel the armed forces of the
United States would come to our aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine. I cannot
refrain from pointing out that such important and explicit words
have never been embodied in any written document from the United
States to us. You also said to Ambassador Eban that
[Page 87]
Israel is guaranteed against Soviet attack no less explicitly than
any other country. This last point is still not fully clear to me
and I should like to return to it on another occasion.
[1 paragraph (51/2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
Four days have passed and we have not yet replied to the Soviet Note.
I told my Cabinet on Sunday that the reply would not be sent before
next week.
I note that you do not regard the British request for a new airlift
of troops as vital. I did not believe, when I sent my message to
Ambassador Lawson, that the
American supply airlifts were crucial in themselves. But if you
think it necessary I now propose that we consult together in an
effort to find an agreed arrangement for bringing them to a
conclusion in a manner satisfactory to both our governments.
Above everything else, I am convinced, Mr. Secretary, of the urgent
need to strengthen the links between the countries which I mentioned
in my letter to the President. I am certain that nothing will more
effectively prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle
East, both directly and indirectly through the aid of Nasser and communists in Arab
countries, than the internal consolidation of the countries of this
group and the strengthening of their mutual ties with each other,
albeit for the time being without publicity.
I am studying with the deepest interest and attention the important
letter which I have received from you on this subject.5
Yours sincerely,
