Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

364. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Acting Secretary of State and the Pakistani Ambassador (Ahmed), Department of State, Washington, July 31, 1959¹

Washington, July 31, 1959

SUBJECT

• Pakistan’s Reactions to Recent Congressional Criticisms of that Country

The Acting Secretary opened the discussion, which had been arranged at the request of the Pakistan Ambassador, by stating that he had just come from the White House where he had listened to the report of the nine Governors who had recently returned from the Soviet Union. The Governors had been impressed, Mr. Dillon said, by the reservoir of good will for the American people which they found to exist among the people of the Soviet Union. The Governors cited as an example their surprise visit to a provincial sports palace inside which they found fifteen hundred people wrestling to music, presumably a massive physical culture class. When the Governors’ presence was announced, all fifteen hundred plus the audience stood up and roundly applauded their distinguished visitors.

The Pakistan Ambassador said that he felt that the Vice President had handled his trip most admirably.² He then turned the discussion to what he said seemed to be a serious trend in Washington thinking, both inside and outside of the Congress, in connection with military aid to Pakistan. This trend, he said, seemed to be based upon four premises which were not sound. He had discussed these with Assistant Secretary Jones a week before but would like to take this opportunity to review them personally with the Acting Secretary. The Government of Pakistan shared these views.

1. That the military threat of communism to the Asian area was receding and that the principal threat was now economic. Certainly, the Ambassador said, this trend of thinking was not justified by recent events in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet. He believed that actually the military threat to free Asia was even more grave than the threat to peace over West Berlin. In his opinion, the dramatic suddenness with which the Berlin crisis had been generated by the U.S.S.R. was explained by the Soviet Union’s desire to detract world attention from the Bloc’s intriguing in the Middle East and Red China’s brutally repressive measures in Tibet. One reason why the Middle East was so important for the Soviets was that it was a natural “jumping off point” for Africa. The free world should certainly not lower its guard. Indeed, if anything, it needed to put more arms and aid into the hands of those willing to use them to defend the free world.

2. That to save Asia the United States must give massive aid to India and show that democracy can “deliver the goods” as well as communism can. This unsound trend, according to Ambassador Ahmed, has been endorsed by both Mr. Adlai Stevenson and Mr. Averall Harriman, to say nothing of Congressman Bowles. The Pakistan Ambassador continued that his country was not opposed to aid to India. Indeed, for their own security and that of the subcontinent both India and Pakistan should be strengthened economically. It was oversimplifying the issues involved, however, to believe that economic aid alone would encourage the growth of democracy. Look at all the aid the United States had been giving for many years to South America, he stressed, and still many South American countries are being governed by dictators. In his belief, aid to each country should be given according to that country’s particular needs. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had taken a step in the right direction in enlarging the scope of the so-called “Kennedy–Cooper resolution”³ on aid to India to embrace all of South Asia, the Pakistan Ambassador had been perturbed to see the Vice President speaking at a recently held conference in Washington which had been organized under private auspices to promote aid to India alone. During the Ambassador’s comments on the “Kennedy–Cooper resolution”, the Acting Secretary interjected the explanation that it was the Department which had initiated action to have the resolution enlarged to embrace all of South Asia and not just India.

3. That United States military aid to Pakistan has been the cause of Indo-Pakistan tensions and has in turn encouraged the Indian military build-up. The facts of history simply do not support this line of reasoning, said Ambassador Ahmed. Indo-Pakistan tensions have been in existence ever since the two countries obtained their independence and long before there was any discussion of military aid to Pakistan. These tensions have centered principally around Kashmir and the division of the Indus waters. These disputes cannot be resolved simply by ignoring them. Their existence should be reflected in Congressional reactions. In discussing aid to Pakistan for instance, the House Foreign Affairs Committee should consider not only Pakistan’s relations to Soviet bloc countries, but also problems which it faces in relation to other non-communist countries such as India.

4. That Pakistan was maintaining military forces in excess of its military needs. Secretary McElroy and General White were not correct in their testimony before Congress.⁴ Whereas it was true that the primary threat to Pakistan was from the north, Pakistan could not ignore the threat from the south, that is to say from India. Ambassador Ahmed said he realized that the United States Government had given assurances to his government regarding possible aggression against Pakistan by India. These assurances, the Ambassador said, had, however, not been made public and did not go as far as comparable assurances to India had gone. If the Government of Pakistan, the Ambassador continued, could be given categoric assurances that the United States would not tolerate any aggression by India against it, perhaps this would have a sobering effect on Indian military circles. If so, the Ambassador said, Pakistan might then itself be able to take a different view of its own military needs. He stressed that eighty percent of India’s military forces were on the Pakistan border and that India could move into Pakistan on ten days’ notice. It was not true to allege, he continued, that the Indian forces were on the border simply because that is where the cantonments had been located in pre-partition days because there were many more troops presently in that area than the old cantonments would have accommodated.

When he had recently talked with Secretary McElroy,⁵ Ambassador Ahmed explained, the Secretary had thought that perhaps it might be desirable if a joint team of technical military experts could study objectively Pakistan’s military needs. Such a team might be made up, the Ambassador said, of the three Pakistan Commanders in Chief and their opposite numbers here. If the study were made in Washington, the Ambassador and some representative from the Department of State might also be represented at the talks. Pakistan, the Ambassador concluded, does not want the United States to waste its money but it was only fair to try to stop trends in thinking and talking in Washington which were both unjust and unjustified.

In reply Mr. Dillon said that there was reason to be concerned at the threat from the north. It was only several years ago that the Soviet economic offensive started and it was still apparently gathering momentum, with always more technicians and more investments being committed in the key countries from the Russians’ point of view. Informed public opinion in the United States was well aware that the United States Government had to provide more funds to counter the Soviet offensive, but at the same time uninformed public opinion was pushing for a reduction in total aid appropriations. As far as Congress was concerned, it was, therefore, more or less inevitable that an attempt should be made to compromise these two opposing forces.

The more “liberal thinkers”, as they called themselves, had convinced themselves, the Acting Secretary said, that since there were no new funds in sight for both economic and military aid, our military aid programs were generally too large. Thus, by reducing our military programs they hoped to find funds for expanding the economic programs without increasing the total Mutual Security Program as a whole. The line of reasoning adopted by the “liberal” group in the Congress had been strengthened by the historical fact that initially military aid had been designed for the purpose of building up forces to oppose outright Soviet military aggression. Since the danger of out right military aggression seemed to have diminished in recent years, this group had now, continued the Acting Secretary, jumped to the conclusion that the free world did not need military programs as much as it did before. It was in order to take an objective view of the relationship between the military and economic programs that the Draper Committee was appointed.

The Administration thus faced a difficult position because of the alliance of the “liberal thinkers” and those who wanted to curtail foreign aid of all kinds. Actually, the solution was larger appropriations for economic aid rather than cutting down military aid. This would depend over the years on the success of educating public opinion. Just as West Berlin, however, had taken heart because it knew that NATO was behind it, so there was no lack of friendship in the United States for Pakistan nor any lack of realization of what Pakistan stood for as our ally. Yet, whenever military aid cuts, either through reducing the total cost of the Mutual Security Program or through a diversion from military to economic aid, were considered by the Congress, the question of Pakistan immediately came to the fore. This was because it was very hard to argue that any substantial cuts in military aid were possible in the case of Korea and Nationalist China or even of Vietnam, in all of which there was always the possibility in the background of an actual military flare up. Thus, Pakistan was left as the only country which could provide a target for possible cuts in military aid. He was certain, the Acting Secretary said, that if there were a clear vote on the question of U.S. friendship and support for Pakistan, the Ambassador would find very strong support for Pakistan in the Congress.

As for Indo-Pakistan relations, it was essential that friendly governments help both countries for if either failed in their minimum economic aspirations, it would have a bad effect on the other. Some people who appeared to be particularly friendly towards India seemed not to want to realize the existence of this close relationship between Pakistan and India and in the first instance to concentrate aid to India, but the Acting Secretary advised the Pakistan Ambassador to look at what had actually happened in connection with the Kennedy–Cooper resolution and the excellent showing of Pakistan in connection with the Development Loan Fund program. Mr. Dillon believed that on a per capita basis Pakistan had received two or three times more assistance from DLF than had India. Indeed, the Pakistan DLF program was one of the very best of all the country programs.

As far as military forces were concerned, the Acting Secretary noted that the United States Government fully realized that Pakistan could not reduce its non-MAP-supported elements. He believed it would be helpful, however, to review jointly on an annual basis Pakistan’s total military costs since the effect of those expenditures impinged generally on Pakistan’s economic progress. He believed that some of those who had testified before the Congress misunderstood that it was not only the Soviet bloc threat which had to be taken into account, but also questions of internal security and policing. Indeed, Mr. Dillon had the feeling that the Indians were no longer talking so much about the alleged “threat” of Pakistan as they had previously in justifying their own military development.

In short, the Acting Secretary assured Ambassador Ahmed Pakistan had nothing to fear as far as the United States Government or the Department was concerned. There had not been and there would not be any slackening on the part of the United States Government or the American people in their friendship for Pakistan or their understanding of its problems.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/7–3159. Secret. Drafted by Bartlett.
2. Reference is to Nixon’s trip to the Soviet Union, July 23–August 5.
3. On February 19, Senators John F. Kennedy (D.–Mass.) and John Sherman Cooper (R.–Ky.) introduced a resolution which called for President Eisenhower to explore with other free nations the advisability of establishing an international mission to consult with India on its economic problems. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee expanded the Kennedy–Cooper resolution to include Pakistan, Burma, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Ceylon on July 28. (S. Rept. 594) On September 11, the resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 11, was adopted by a voice vote and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 12.
4. See Document 358.
5. See Document 360.