Office of the Historian

57. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary (Bundy)1

Washington, May 23, 1964.

I.

In connection with your Sunday meeting of the Executive Committee on Southeast Asia,2 you may wish to note the following points relating to item 4 on your agenda3 entitled “Other immediate actions: State to report on efforts to forestall a Geneva Conference on Laos”. Actions taken in this regard have been:

1.
Immediate coordination between Unger and Souvanna to ensure Souvanna’s support for Article 4 consultations in Vientiane, although being prepared to accept a conference on Laos in principle if certain key pre-conditions to be discussed on basis Article 4 are agreed to in advance by all concerned.
2.
Coordination talks with the British over the past several days.
3.
A circular telegram to all our posts in countries signatories of the Geneva Accords defining our position and asking for any urgent major [Page 103] comments they might have.4 Discussions with host government not authorized. We have received only one reply—from Lodge—which was completely in accord with our position.
4.
We wired Vientiane today (Saturday)5 instructing Unger to induce Souvanna to make a clarifying statement regarding Vientiane as the locus for Article 4 consultations, since Souvanna’s position has not been entirely clear publicly on that point.
5.
Following Souvanna’s clarifying statement, action posts will consult with host governments on the basis of the various telegrams we have sent out reporting our position.

Comment: We are not rushing our consultations with other countries since there is advantage in dragging things out, but there is also a need to counteract the French who have been very active on the diplomatic front on this issue.

II.

I recommend that you flag the problem of possible moves to have the UN concern itself with Laos. L and some people in IO so favor.6 I am not only opposed because of the “Hairy” Project you have up your sleeve,7 but also because:

1.
A UN presence in Laos right now would help the Pathet Lao to consolidate their most recent gains.
2.
The Communists would be far less inhibited and prevented from covert-type actions than we would be, were the UN to get itself in the act.
3.
UN involvement has never been successful in this kind of situation, although it is a good way to waive our responsibilities in Laos and get out.
4.
Because of the above, a UN involvement might well discourage the anti-Communists in Laos.
5.
If the UN gets involved in Laos, the pressure will be on for its involvement in Viet-Nam as well.
6.
To discuss Laos in the Security Council would almost inevitably require the presence of North Vietnamese representatives in New York.
7.
To recommend UN action in Laos raises the question: why not a Geneva Conference, particularly in view of the fact that Peiping and Hanoi, interested parties, are not members of the UN?

  1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Special Papers, Apr/June 1964. Secret.↩
  2. See Document 61.↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. Circular telegram 2169, May 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩
  5. Not further identified.↩
  6. The Legal Advisor’s recommendation is in a memorandum from Chayes to William Bundy, May 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩
  7. The “Hairy” project has not been identified, but it could relate to recommendations proposed by Bundy in Document 60.↩