Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

460. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, February 6, 1976.

• Circular 175 Procedure: Request for Authorization to Negotiate and Conclude an Executive Agreement with the Government of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas Regarding Our Continued Use of Military Facilities, Continued Exercise of Certain Operating Rights and the Status of U.S. Forces in The Bahamas

Summary

It is anticipated that talks will shortly begin with the Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas looking to the conclusion of a definitive arrangement permitting the continued use of U.S. military facilities and operating rights in that country. This memorandum updates the Circular 175 approved on October 23, 1973, and requests that you authorize me and those officers designated by me to carry out negotiations on this matter.

Discussion

Following independence on July 10, 1973, an interim agreement was concluded with the Government of The Bahamas on July 20, 1973, to permit U.S. military facilities and operating rights to continue in that country pending the conclusion of definitive arrangements. The interim agreement set the end of 1973 as the target date for the conclusion of negotiations for a definitive agreement, and on October 23, 1973, the then Under Secretary for Political Affairs approved a U.S. negotiating position as outlined in a Circular 175 memorandum (Tab 1). At the request of the GCOB, however, the target date for reaching agreement was extended several times, and no definitive agreement has as yet been negotiated.

The GCOB has now made it clear that it wishes to commence negotiations. Accordingly, we have authorized our Ambassador to proceed with an offer, the substance of which is outlined below. This authorization was based on the authority of the above-mentioned Circular 175 which I believe (and L concurs) remains applicable in its major points. The purpose of this memorandum is to update certain portions of the original negotiating authority.

The definitive agreements would delineate the facility and operating rights which we seek to maintain in return for certain monetary and other considerations. This Circular would authorize me or my designees to undertake negotiations with the Bahamian Government. We will act in coordination with the Department of Defense and have the support of their technical experts as required.

U.S. Objectives

Specific foreseeable U.S. military requirements on which we hope to achieve GCOB agreement include the following:

1. Continued use through 1991 of the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) on Andros Island, the U.S. Naval Facility on Eleuthera Island, the U.S. Air Force Eastern Test Range facilities on Grand Bahama Island, and a Coast Guard Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN) Station;

2. Continued operating rights for U.S. military vessels and aircraft to utilize Bahamian air space and waters during the same period. (We do not regard these operating rights as essential to the conclusion of a generally satisfactory agreement, however); and

3. A Status of Forces agreement covering U.S. personnel assigned to our facilities in The Bahamas.

In addition, we propose an exchange of notes with the UK to reflect our new U.S.–GCOB arrangements. This bilateral U.S.–UK agreement would also complement a conferral of third-party rights on the UK in the text of the U.S.–GCOB facilities agreement, permitting the UK to continue to use our facilities in The Bahamas.

UK Objectives

The UK desires the following:

1. Continued use of our AUTEC and Eastern Test Range facilities as long as the U.S. retains them;

2. Conclusion of a UK/GCOB Status of Forces agreement covering UK military personnel in The Bahamas; and

3. Rights to utilize Bahamian airspace and territorial seas similar to those which we seek.

GCOB Position

Although a special relationship with the U.S. appeared to be the primary GCOB aim at the time of independence, economic considerations are evidently now paramount in the minds of the Bahamian leaders. In a September 25 letter to our Ambassador, the Bahamian Foreign Minister suggested an extremely high price for our continued use of our facilities and operating rights in The Bahamas: annual rental of $5 million, plus $500 million over ten years in “economic, technical, and security assistance,” both to be retroactive to July 10, 1973 (Tab 2).

The GCOB is apparently no longer interested in association with NATO or entry into the OAS. It does continue to attach considerable importance to its chief interest in LOS matters, its claim to archipelago status, and our support on this issue may again be sought during the anticipated negotiations. (We have taken the position that we will support their archipelago concept only in the context of an acceptable international LOS agreement which meets our requirements, particularly as regards transit rights.) The GCOB may also continue to have an interest in U.S. measures to stimulate tourism to the islands and in eligibility for U.S. defense articles and training.

U.S. Offer

DOD has conducted an extensive review of the current military value of the facilities and the resources available to DOD to meet GCOB compensation requirements. Based on this study and other considerations, we believe we may be able to conclude a satisfactory agreement if we negotiate with the following as our maximum offer:

1. Annual rental payments of $6.15 million, based on a 15-year lease to begin with conclusion of the agreement. An allocation of a portion of the rental monies in the amount of approximately $15 million over a 15-year period may be applied to a training program for Bahamian citizens (a shorter lease period or retroactive rent would require an appropriate scaling down of the maximum rent we are prepared to pay);

2. Offer of $5 million in FMS credits for FY 77 and sympathetic consideration of future FMS credit requests up to a total of $25 million, subject to congressional authorization (such FMS credit could be used to fund the acquisition of defense articles specified in a 1973 DOD survey of GCOB security requirements or other items or services as agreed and authorized);

3. We are also willing to offer, subject to congressional approval, if necessary, a formula which would allow a lump-sum prepayment of part of the rent which would accrue to the GCOB over the 15-year period;

4. The turn back to the GCOB of over 2,000 acres of land now included in the U.S. facilities;

5. Continued improvement of the U.S. facilities, with accompanying economic benefits to the GCOB, totaling about $15 million;

6. A continuous review of employment practices at the U.S. facilities in order to insure that there will be no unfair treatment in the employment of Bahamians or in their compensation.

In addition, the UK is willing to provide a grant of 3.5 million pounds in security assistance, plus an annual payment of 0.5 million pounds, all of which are contingent on conclusion of a successful agreement between the U.S. and the GCOB.

Main elements of the above offer were conveyed to the GCOB December 24. The GCOB has not yet replied.

We are not, at this time, prepared to offer concessionary economic assistance to the GCOB as a part of the quid for continued use of the facilities. State/AID strongly oppose provision of such assistance, because the relatively high Bahamian per capita income (about $2,400) eliminates The Bahamas from the category of poor countries which Congress clearly intends should benefit from U.S. economic aid. State/AID also believe that the provision of such assistance to The Bahamas would inevitably raise the price of our continued use of military facilities in Barbados and in Antigua (the present agreement for the use of which expires in 1977). The DOD, for its part, does not wish to completely foreclose the possibility of considering the addition of a modest economic assistance package to our quid if it becomes clear that negotiations will fail without such assistance. All Agencies agree, however, that negotiations should be opened without extending any prospect of economic assistance to the GCOB.

Ancillary Agreements

At Tab 3, there are attached the texts of a draft U.S.–GCOB Facilities and Status of Forces Agreement, a U.S.–GCOB Operating Rights Agreement, and a U.S.–UK Agreement relating to continued UK use of U.S. facilities in The Bahamas. We anticipate that, simultaneously with the signature of these agreements, we would execute with the GCOB a lease of our military facilities, a memorandum of understanding regarding foreign military sales, and an exchange of notes outlining the remaining elements of the U.S. offer, described above. The proposed agreements at Tab C have been reviewed by the Office of the Legal Adviser. That Office has determined that they can be concluded as executive agreements under present law, but recommends congressional consultation regarding the form of the various proposed agreements. A Memorandum of Law is annexed at Tab 4.

Legal Authority

Although, as the Memorandum of Law at Tab 4 concludes, the proposed agreements can all properly be concluded as executive agreements under present law, the Congress has exhibited during recent years an ever-increasing interest in the form and substance of international agreements relating to U.S. military facilities abroad. Accordingly, we are consulting with concerned Congressmen and congressional committees. Should these consultations result in a request that any part of the proposed agreement be submitted to the Congress for approval, further recommendations to you regarding this matter will be forthcoming.

NSDM 221 of June 5, 1973, directed that any agreement worked out should be on an ad referendum basis and submitted to the President for final approval. Our initial response to this NSDM reported on the interim Carry Over Agreement which will preserve our military rights in The Bahamas while negotiations continue on a definitive agreement.

The Department of Defense and the Coast Guard concur in the foregoing.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs or his designee to engage in negotiations based upon the draft agreements at Tab C for the purposes and in the manner described above, including consultation with the concerned congressional committees.

2. That you authorize the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, subject to the concurrence of L, PM, H, DOD, Coast Guard, and other concerned offices and agencies, to approve changes in the texts of the agreements at Tab C resulting from negotiations and consistent with the U.S. objectives described above.

3. That you authorize the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in Nassau to sign the resulting agreements, subject to the President’s approval in accordance with NSDM 221.

1. Summary: Rogers requested renewed authorization for the conclusion of an agreement with The Bahamas on access to military facilities there, and he described the terms of the offer that the United States was prepared to make to the Bahamian Government.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830032–0668. Confidential. Drafted by Heavner on January 19; cleared by Rovine and in draft by Michel, Nelson, Masson, May, and Hintze. Sisco initialed his approval to all three recommendations on February 7. A copy was sent to Crowley in EUR/NE. The attachments at Tabs 1 and 2 are published as Documents 440 and 455. Tabs 3 and 4 are attached but not published. In telegram 427 from Nassau, March 12, the Embassy reported that Adderley intended to renew talks after an upcoming trip to the United Nations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760094–0529) In telegram 1740 from Nassau, November 5, Weiss reported that the Bahamian Government was not approaching the negotiations with a sense of urgency. (Ibid., D760413–0688) NSDM 221, dated June 5, 1973, is published as Document 433.