Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

335. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, January 28, 1980

SUBJECT

• Expedited Deliveries of Equipment to Egypt (S)

As we discussed at breakfast on January 25,² Defense has analyzed the options for expediting delivery of F–16 aircraft and M60 tanks to Egypt (see attached paper and tables).³ The options are illustrative and designed to show a range of possibilities from which the Egyptians would be invited to choose when a US team visits Egypt the latter half of February.⁴ The object then would be to reach agreement on the sales which would constitute the initial increment of an Egyptian long-term defense program. The precise components of the program should be left to the Egyptians. A preview of the options could be presented to Ambassador Ghorbal and Defense Attache Abou Ghazala at the end of January.

The options show that:

(1) At the approved FMS credit levels the Egyptians could expedite aircraft deliveries if they are willing to limit themselves to a small number of M60 tanks and forgo other new programs until FY 1982. The more they accelerate aircraft deliveries, the fewer tanks they can buy. If they insist on F–16 deliveries beginning in December 1980, they could buy only 40 M60 tanks, and they would not be able to order more later because the production line will have shut down.

(2) With an additional $200 million in FY 1981 credits the Egyptians could expedite an 80 F–16 aircraft program somewhat (beginning in December 1982) and still buy 700 tanks and have some $70 million a year in FY 1980 and 81 to begin other new programs. Greater acceleration or insistence on F–15 aircraft would severely limit the total number of aircraft, tanks in some instances, and other new programs even with an additional $200 million in FY 1981.

(3) The approved $1.5 billion limit on cash flow financing does not affect our ability to expedite aircraft deliveries, but it does prevent us from offering initially more than a small fraction of the 120 F–16 aircraft and 900 M60 tanks requested by Egypt. If this limit were raised to $2.7 billion and the Egyptians opted for F–16 deliveries beginning in 1982, we could sign Letters of Offer and Acceptance in 1980 for 80 F–16’s and 700 tanks.

In a working level meeting during Vice President Mubarak’s visit⁵ we gave the Egyptians tables of aircraft and tank delivery options assuming the approved FMS financing and normal production leadtimes. As the meeting progressed, the Egyptians appeared to gain a better appreciation of the way in which financing constraints and production leadtimes limit our ability to expedite deliveries. We think this understanding could be further improved by the discussions which Dave McGiffert will lead in Cairo in February, though the political importance attached by Sadat and Mubarak to early F–16 deliveries and/or F–15 sales is unlikely to change as shown by Ambassador Atherton’s cables⁶ of January 26.

The following changes from the constraints already given the Egyptians would be improvements resulting from the Mubarak visit which, along with our willingness to accelerate F–16 and M60 deliveries, would give the US team a good basis for achieving agreement on the initial sales package for the long-term program:

(1) $550 million of FMS credits in FY 1981 instead of $350 million. This adjustment could be made during the foreign assistance hearings or submitted in a later supplemental ($20 million extra in obligational authority, $0 in outlays, covers the extra $200 million in FMS credits).⁷

(2) $2.7 billion limit on cash flow financing instead of $1.5 billion.⁸

(3) Willingness to discuss options for providing F–15 aircraft, subject to your final approval. Given the late delivery (second half of 1983), high cost ($1450 million for 19 aircraft), and potential for disapproval by you or Congress, the Egyptians may decide against going ahead with F–15’s at this time, though my guess would be that they’ll then press for early (and many) F–16’s and the F–15’s later.⁹

(4) Diversion of equipment in production for US forces instead of normal production leadtime assumed in discussions to date with Egyptians. (Secretary of Defense will approve.)

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 2/1–15/80. Secret. The memorandum bears a stamped date of January 28. Copies of the memorandum were sent to Vance and McIntyre.
2. The January 25 breakfast meeting, attended by Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Donovan, Jordan, and Cutler, took place from 7:30 a.m. to 8:56 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. See Document 343.
5. See Document 293 and footnote 4 thereto.
6. Reference is to the telegram conveying Sadat’s January 26 letter to Carter, printed as Document 333, and the oral points presented by Mubarak to Atherton on January 26, discussed in footnote 2, Document 333.
7. An unknown hand indicated approval of this option.
8. This option was neither approved nor disapproved.
9. This option was neither approved nor disapproved. In a January 31 memorandum to Brzezinski, Hunter stated that Brown’s proposal that the United States discuss provision of F–15s to Egypt at “some later date” was made in response to Presidential comments on Sadat’s January 28 letter (printed as Document 333). (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–6/80)