Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

336. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Riyadh, February 5, 1980, 11 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s and Mr. Christopher’s Meeting with Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
• U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John West
• Eugene Bovis
• Gary Sick
• Arnie Raphel
• Jerry Schecter
• Robert Proctor
• Prince Saud
• Mr. Mansouri
• Ambassador al-Hegalan
• Abdul Aziz Thunayyan
• Notetaker

[Omitted here is discussion of regional issues unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

[Prince Saud:] One area on which there is no consensus with the United States is the problem of Israel. That problem has made the both of us unable to make the kind of response to the Soviets that we would like. We have tried not to make this a fundamental contradiction in cooperation with the United States but it does come into effect with regards to the Soviets. Of course we want U.S. help. We see no U.S. threat to our independence. We have no fear of the United States which would act as a constraint on our actions. Our past strategy was based on alliance between Saudi Arabia and Egypt that worked for a decade. The Soviets lost ground in this area for the first time. They lost their positions in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, which was capable of continuing to maintain its independence. However, the split between Egypt and Saudi Arabia has broken that without providing us with any alternative strategy to replace it. We have not been able to persuade Egypt and they have not been able to persuade us. We hope that the U.S. will be contributing to remove the reasons for this split. The Middle East problem is central at all levels. These thoughts reflect the situation as it is here. It is something that we live with. It is never far away from us. It is the way we face challenges to our independence and our way of life. Now we must devolve a way to meet these challenges.

Dr. Brzezinski said this raised the truly fundamental questions and very difficult questions that you and we face. In the talk with Prince Fahd yesterday we were very much in agreement about the nature and the scope of the threat. It is very real and there is very little time left. With regard to U.S. strategy the President’s State of the Union message² represented a point of departure. It was a very important statement and in many respects it was a historical affirmation of the new realities we face. After World War II we established a permanent presence in Western Europe and linked our security with theirs. This was followed by treaties in the Far East. We now appreciate that events in this region also affect these other regions and the United States, so at present we have three strategic zones: Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East. The conditions in these three areas are very different. It would be a mistake to try to deal with this region as if we were replaying the old formal alliances of Europe. Rather we intend to create a framework of enhanced security. We envision six levels for directions of U.S. activity in the region. First on the Arab-Israel front, we recognize the pernicious effects of this problem in radicalizing the region. We are straining our resources. We are risking the President’s political capital to try to resolve this issue. Ambassador Linowitz has just been here³ so you should have some idea of our strategy. We believe that autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza will lead to a new situation. We recognize that the Palestinians are a people and they must find a way to express this in a way which is acceptable to the Israelis. This process is underway and is moving fast enough for Egypt and that is something. However, we must also focus on Jerusalem. Once Ambassadors are exchanged⁴ we should be able to move with greater energy. We hope we can use the special religious character of Jerusalem as an opening wedge. We would like at a minimum to reduce the polemics between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and develop some tacit understanding on security issues recognizing that open relations are probably going to be very difficult. Sadat is very emotional (Prince Saud interjected so are we but we do not talk as much). We would hope that at least some tacit cooperation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be possible dealing with the questions of Sudan and Yemen as these become more acute. Three, we will try to obtain military facilities—not bases but air and naval facilities which will permit us to project power into the area effectively, quickly, and decisively. We are also considering landings by marines or an airborne brigade. We need to work out the details with the host country. It might be Egypt, it might be Oman. If it is convenient for Saudi Arabia, that would be another possibility. Four, we want to cooperate with Saudi Arabia to reinforce Somalia and Oman. Both of us have a stake in the security of these two countries. We must talk to you more concretely about facilities and their security needs. This is especially important if we need to seal off Yemen. Cooperation is very important. We must also move forward on the Yemen issue. We hope you will tell us more about the emissary from North Yemen. Five, we intend to reinforce Pakistan. Something which six months ago would have been incredible has transpired. We will talk to the Pakistanis about their defense needs, send a military team to strengthen the northwest frontier, and take other steps to make it difficult for the Soviets to use Afghanistan as a military base. Six, we would like to work with Iran once the hostage issue is behind us. The natural reaction in the United States after the hostages are released would be to punish Iran for mistreating the hostages.

Prince Saud wondered what we meant by mistreatment.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that they had been isolated and bound. The US public will feel fiercely when they are finally released.

Mr. Christopher noted that the real issue was mental scarring from their treatment. He noted that Schmidt had remarked on the effects of only three days of being a hostage in Somalia;⁵ whereas, these people have been held for over ninety days.

Dr. Brzezinski said in any event we will resist the inclination to punish Iran for this. Iran and Pakistan together provide the forward line and depth against Soviet incursion so we are going to pursue a six part strategy: on the Arab-Israel question; relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt; to build up our own military strength; to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on Yemen; to reinforce Pakistan; and to leave the door open for cooperation with Iran. This is different from our strategy in Europe but if we pursue it we think there is a good chance of stabilizing the area. We would also like to open a dialogue with other Arab states. Dr. Brzezinski had spent several days in Algeria recently and now we have a relationship with them that we didn’t have before. We would like the same thing with Libya and also with Iraq if that does not threaten Saudi interests.

Prince Saud said that on the Israeli problem the United States asks us to look at it dispassionately; we also ask you to look dispassionately from Camp David. How will we meet the real threats. The real hope in dealing with this issue is not to govern our actions with respect to the psychology of the Israelis. This will not make them willing to accept compromises and it will alienate the Arab side which is also needed in this process. The Saudis need national backing just the same as the United States does. It is incomprehensible here why the United States is not providing Pakistan with military support of the same level and nature that it does to Israel. With regard to Egypt and the speed of the progress on the Palestinian core issue we have long had relations with Egypt and we know the swings of activity, which are not new. They have existed since Nasser’s⁶ time. Prince Fahd has said that if we are frustrated it is because Sadat is not succeeding, not because we want him to fail. Sadat has taken the lead in this process. He took the lead on 242 and all the rest of the Arab nations followed. He went to Camp David and took another channel in the peace process and the rest of the Arab world is not fast enough to follow him in that direction. If damage is done to Egypt, the pendulum can swing just as fast. We have nightmares about this. We hope that Egypt will remain an open society and maintain its political direction away from the Soviets. We are far more interested in this than the Americans are, so we are very careful. As far as timing goes there is a need for Sadat to fulfill the expectations that he has raised. As far as the exchange of Ambassadors is concerned, why should it all be on one side. Why should the gestures always be something that Israel wants and not something that would satisfy Arab public opinion. We certainly hope the Ambassador will not go to Jerusalem. If time is given to one

aspect of the question, then time should be given to all aspects of the question. The speeding up of this process must not be at the expense of the trust of others. If so, it will react badly on Egypt. Not all Egyptians are President Sadats. We hope that he will regain the leadership of the Arab world. If we feel frustration, it is not because we do not want cooperation with the United States but because we see the dangers involved. The Israeli problem will be solved over time that is certain but we see dangers of letting it go on for a very long period of time with no progress. Right now the Syrians are preparing for a war of attrition. Why is that? They see the acceleration of delivery of F–16s to Israel. It is important that the United States pay a little attention to the psychology of the Arab world who will be your allies against the Soviet Union. Israel is not a bulwark against the Soviets. They are rather the way the Soviets enter the region. If Israel is interested in maintaining a noncommunist Middle East, then they must cooperate. They cannot provide military hegemony in the region as a way of keeping the Soviets out. If I express my emotions, I can only say that you listen to Sadat when he is emotional. (Dr. Brzezinski noted that when Prince Saud was emotional he sounded like President Sadat when he was calm.)

Dr. Brzezinski said the President feels very much as you do. You are speaking to the converted. However, if we compare today as opposed to two years ago there has been staggering progress made. The Israelis have now given up the notion of retaining Sinai. They said that they would never give up the settlements. In a walk with Begin he said that his hand would fall off, his eyes would fall out, before giving up a single Israeli settlement. Yet, he signed the paper giving up Israeli settlements. This is not fast enough for you or for us. The problem is how to keep the United States people, the Congress and the Israeli people on our side. There has been a breakthrough in defining self-rule for the Palestinians. No longer is the issue how to incorporate Judea and Sumeria [Samaria] into Israel. This process is accelerated. Israeli public opinion shows a genuine shift in recognizing the need to hand over the West Bank for a true security settlement.

Prince Saud said yes, you do affect public opinion in Israel. On settlements the biggest change in Israeli public opinion came when the President said that settlements were illegal and stopped some deliveries of some economic and military equipment. In the same way you could influence the Palestinian question. If the Israelis feel that regardless of their policy they could count on unhindered aid from the United States, they will not change their policy. Who will argue with Begin if he succeeds.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he was uncomfortable in dealing with this since Ambassador Linowitz had been here only recently and he was better informed about the nature of the overall process. The question of course is how to choose the right moment and what issue to press. Both sides are forming their own view of home rule. At some point a positive intervention may move the situation forward. We do not intend to maintain a status quo. We know it is not tolerable. It is not even just.

Prince Saud said that the status quo would be a stumbling block.

Mr. Christopher recalled that Prince Fahd had said that Arafat was here and that it would be a service to his reputation if he was able to help with the hostage situation. He recalled that a year ago we had a close call in getting the PLO to accept Resolution 242. We came within an eyelash of getting that acceptance. Now that has slipped away. Is there a way to return to that?

Prince Saud said this is a representation problem. Keeping the PLO away from the negotiations does not result in security. Rather it is an unnecessary complication which the Israelis wanted to add to the talks. The Saudis had tried to get recognition of the 242 by the Palestinians at the time of Geneva,⁷ when there was a general Arab position to negotiate. They hoped to get the Palestinians into that negotiating team. Since that time many things have changed; the PLO is interested in US recognition and would be of benefit to the negotiations. How that would happen, I don’t know. Ambassador Linowitz asked the same question. If the US in some way takes the position of solving the Palestinian question on the basis of self-determination, it could make them take the plunge. This issue is very important to them since it is one of the key negotiating cards which they would bring to the negotiating table.

Mr. Christopher noted that acceptance of Resolution 242 was not frivolous or pure formality since it involved the acceptance of the future viability of Israel. This would be a major contribution.

Prince Saud said yes, for US public opinion; but for the Palestinians resolution 242 involves the recognition of Israel without dealing with the Palestinian problem. It is a unilateral step without any guarantees from Israel. They see this as the end of the negotiations not the beginning.

Mr. Christopher said there are various forms which were suggested in the past which would make it more balanced. That has continued relevance and vitality. We hope it has not been dropped by your side.

Prince Saud said that the Palestinians would probably be willing to accept 242 if the United States could give some indication of its determination to resolve the problem on the basis of self-determination.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that we use the formula that the Palestinians should participate in the determination of their own future rather than using the word self-determination. This is a result of Israeli security concerns which have not been inconsiderable in the past. The autonomy talks are not intended to create a regime which will last forever, but it is necessary that the Palestinians become engaged in the process.

Prince Saud said that what prevents them from becoming engaged is the unwillingness to recognize the PLO. When Israel says it does not want to talk to the PLO, they are really saying that they want to avoid dealing with the Palestinian problem.

Dr. Brzezinski said we recognize that but we also seek movement. There is a debate in progress about the West Bank, that is a breakthrough. More and more Israelis say that they should talk to the Palestinians—Dayan, Weizman, Evron—but it is not easy to force this process. It takes time.

Prince Saud said at the present time this is a festering sore that will remain that way unless the United States makes an incision.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we prefer healing to surgery. Begin used to say that the PLO was a gang of murderers. Now the PLO has begun to talk more intelligently. Both sides are changing.

Prince Saud said that we trust the motives of the United States to get a resolution of the problem based on justice, equity, and a stable solution. We do not question the US motives but on the timing we know that the Soviets want to implement their objectives now, not in the next decade. Whatever we can do to speed that process we must do it. One thing you could do would be to accept the PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski said the fact that you keep pressing us is helpful. It not only makes us keep this issue in the forefront but also to recognize the need to consider the views of Arabs, just as we take consideration of the Israeli views. The Europeans are ahead of us on this issue. That also helps. We appreciate how deeply you feel on this subject.

Prince Saud said he would take advantage of this open door policy on the Palestinians and keep pressing.

Dr. Brzezinski said he had a number of scars on his back because of the position he had taken on this issue in the past.

[Omitted here is discussion of regional issues unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 2/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Building. The meeting was the third of three meetings with Saudi officials during Brzezinski’s and Christopher’s visit to Riyadh February 4–5. The memorandum of conversation was found attached to the memoranda of conversation for the first two meetings, as well as a February 20 covering memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski, submitting the memoranda for approval with a further recommendation to pass them to Christopher. On the covering memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “They should be held v. v. tightly. Can they be at State? ZB.” A second note on the covering memorandum, written by Dodson, reads: “Dispatched to [Executive Secretary to the Deputy Secretary John H.] Trattner after talking to him 2/27. CD.”
2. During his January 23, 1980, address before a joint session of Congress, Carter declared that the United States would use military force if necessary to defand its national interests in the Persian Gulf region: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” The text of Carter’s address is in “Transcript of President’s State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress,” The New York Times, January 24, 1980, p. A12. See also Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
3. See footnote 1, Document 334.
4. On February 26, Egypt and Israel formally exchanged Ambassadors in parallel ceremonies. Saad Murtada represented Egypt as its first Ambassador to Israel; Eliahu Ben-Elissar was installed as Israel’s first Ambassador to Egypt. (William Claiborne, “Cairo, Jerusalem Ceremonies Accredit First Ambassadors,” The Washington Post, February 27, 1980, p. A14)
5. Reference is to the October 1977 hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
6. Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt from 1956 until 1970.
7. See footnote 5, Document 24.