Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica¹

Washington, June 30, 1979, 0235Z

Tosec 60162/169011. San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: U.S. Strategy—Nicaragua. Ref: State 167615 (Notal).²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. David Aaron chaired an SCC meeting today which considered U.S. strategies to Nicaragua, and discussed reftel. The SCC decided to modify that proposal.

3. Reports from Ambassadors Pezzullo and Bowdler indicate that we have limited prospects of establishing an independent Executive Committee of moderates with enough support to bargain effectively with the FSLN-backed provisional government (PG).³ Nonetheless, we believe that you should continue to pursue aggressively this goal or some modification of it, which might establish transitional and legitimate group which can assume power when Somoza departs. It should also be supported by a reconstituted National Guard capable of being legitimized by adequate support of Nicaraguan people and OAS members. We regard this as a very important objective. We do not want to find ourselves in a position where the only effective military force in Nicaragua is controlled by the Sandinistas. At the same time, we want to maintain and expand our channels of communication with the FSLN/PG in order to seek to modify the composition of the provisional government and set forth certain conditions which will give the moderates a fair opportunity to survive in the power struggle that is bound to ensue.

4. Ambassadors Pezzullo and Bowdler should expand and intensify their contacts with moderate leaders to assess their interests in serving on an Executive Committee-type group which would oversee negotiations with the PG. You should, of course, reiterate that we have no intention of trying to set up a competing force to the PG. Rather, we are interested in trying to develop a framework and transitional arrangements by which all elements could participate in a government of national reconciliation.

5. Expansion of the PG is essential to counter-balance the extremists and give the moderates a chance to participate. Our best leverage on the PG is our apparent capacity to get Somoza to step down as well as the desire of the PG for our ultimate recognition. We may have some additional leverage in the form of the PG’s hope for economic recovery help which any new government is going to need badly.

6. In your continuing conversations with the PG, Torrijos, Carazo, CAP, and Herrera, you should seek an expanded Junta membership (as per below); a ceasefire/standstill; a clear promise of no reprisals, revolutionary courts and executions; agreement for continued existence of GN units (under different leadership) under the ceasefire/standstill arrangement pending an eventual reconstitution of police and security forces by the new government of national reconciliation; and perhaps some plan similar to the sanctuary proposal of Torrijos.

7. Possible additional PG members could be:

—Mariano Fialloa; rector of Theonal University, a man respected by both sides for fairness and objectivity.

—Ernesto Fernandez Holman: A banker who can inspire the confidence of the international lending institutions and the private sector. He is young and progressive—of the generation as Robelo, Ramirez and most of the FSLN leaders.

— Julio Gutierrez or some other professional soldier who commands respect and has not been involved in any of Somoza’s recent repression. We need a tough soldier to put backbone in the civilian moderates and negotiate a merger of the FSLN and GN with the likes of Ortega Saavedra.

—Emilio Alvenez Montalban or Archbishop Obando Y Bravo: Men who stand above the struggle and are respected for their wisdom, fairness and unwillingness to compromise with Somoza.

8. For Ambassador Moss: You should try to get General Torrijos to focus more on the post-Somoza military situation in Nicaragua. We found his idea of sanctuaries interesting, but it also has potential traps, e.g. forcing opposition elements out of the country. You should try to learn more about how he thinks this idea could be developed. How does he visualize the fusion of the GN and the FSLN forces? Does he see the possibility of a breakdown in law and order, or perhaps continued fighting between GN elements and FSLN factions? If so, how does he think we could avoid that? Can the GN be reconstituted? Would he be willing to see an alternative military force to the Sandinista army? At one point, he mentioned the possibility of sending Panamanian troops to maintain law and order. Would he be willing to help us persuade other OAS countries to provide peacekeeping elements? FYI: While we would not rule out Panamanian participation in a multilateral group, we agree with Ambassador Pezzullo that Panamanian troops alone [garble] dangerous tensions (see Managua 2870).⁴ End FYI.

9. To all action and info posts: If head of state or other leader in your countries has some knowledge or influence on Nicaraguan National Guard (GN) or members of GN, you may want to try to solicit ideas on ways to maintain a reconstituted National Guard or perhaps a portion of a GN in a post-Somoza period.

10. For Bogota, Lima, Tegucigalpa, Caracas: You may also want to try to encourage leaders in host country to think more and more about what will happen after Somoza leaves, and what their government would be interested in doing to improve the chances of a moderate, democratic Nicaragua.

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840126–2380. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Bogotá, Guatemala City, Lima, Quito, and Tegucigalpa. The President and Vance departed the G–7 Economic Summit in Tokyo and then paid a State visit to South Korea. Drafted by Pastor and Vaky; cleared in S/S–O; approved by Christopher.
2. See Document 243.
3. For Bowdler’s report, see Document 234. For Pezzullo’s reports, see Documents 239 and 245.
4. See Document 239.